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**Advantage 1 is Innovation —**

**Standards-Setting Organizations** [SSO’s] **are industry members who jointly establish standards for information tech defined by the adoption of standard-essential patents** [SEP’s]**, which are licensed to companies who wish to implement the tech in their product, called implementers, on Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory** [FRAND] **terms. Current standards promote price gouging, FRAND enforcement is critical.**

**Melamed & Shapiro 18**, \*A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf)

I. Standard Setting and the Competitive Process

The **fundamental economics** in the **information technology** sector, driven by **network effects**, implies that there is **enormous value** associated with establishing compatibility standards. Popular standards include the mobile broadband standards used in cell phones, which are established by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), and the Wi-Fi technology for wireless local area networks, which is enabled by the 802.11 standard established by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).4

There are many SSOs, and their rules and procedures differ considerably. In addition to IEEE, leading SSOs include the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).5 SSOs generally establish standards by holding a series of committee meetings among industry participants. These meetings culminate in a vote on a technical specification that describes what features or attributes a product must have in order to comply with the standard. Most SSOs are open to all industry participants and seek to operate on a consensus basis, applying certain voting rules. SSOs do not normally engage in patent licensing, nor do they specify how patent royalties will be divided up among patent holders. They leave that to their members, which in some cases form patent pools to address these issues.6

SSOs adopt specific policies relating to intellectual property rights (IPRs).7 These IPR policies are generally intended to enable the SEP holders to obtain reasonable royalties for licensing their patents, while prohibiting them from charging excessive royalties after other industry participants have committed to the standard. At that point, firms committed to implementing the standard— which we call “implementers”—would find it **very costly** to avoid using the patented technology. For this purpose, most SSOs require SEP owners to license their SEPs on FRAND terms.8

FRAND policies are especially necessary because negotiations between SEP holders and implementers generally **take place only after** the implementers have used and infringed the technologies claimed by the SEPs. Standards involving information and communications technology can involve hundreds or even **thousands of SEPs**, many with **uncertain boundaries** for infringement. In addition, a time lag exists between patent application and patent issuance. For these and other reasons, it is **impractical** for implementers to enter into negotiations for patent licenses with all SEP owners prior to the establishment of a standard and to their implementation of it.9

The fact that patent negotiations generally do not take place until after implementers have used and infringed the technologies has several critical implications. First, at the time of negotiation, implementers are **locked into the standard** and the technologies claimed by the SEPs—that is, the **cost to switch** to an alternative technology or standard at that point—ex post—is **much greater** than it was ex ante, before the patented technology was first included in the standard. Ex post, the patent holder is no longer competing to have its technology included in the standard, nor is it competing to have implementers of the standard use its technology. Instead, because the patent holder owns an asset that is essential to the standard, implementers have no choice but to use the patented technology.

If the standard is commercially successful, implementers are willing to pay a much larger royalty for use of the patented technology than they would have paid ex ante, when the SEP holder faced competition from other technologies. In these circumstances, the SEP holder can be said to have obtained **monopoly power** in the market in which the patented technology is licensed for use in implementing the standard.10

Second, because of lock-in and the implementer’s ongoing infringement, the **potential for litigation looms large** in licensing negotiations. In effect, the parties are negotiating about how to settle an infringement suit, and that negotiation is **heavily influenced** by their predictions as to what the court will do if they cannot agree. This situation is not unique to SEPs; it arises frequently when firms are faced with patent infringement claims for products they have independently developed or technologies they have inadvertently infringed. Patent law addresses such instances by specifying that patent holders are entitled to “**reasonable royalties**,” defined as the royalties that the parties would have negotiated prior to the infringement and thus prior to lock-in.11 Those hypothetical ex ante royalties reflect the market value of the patent license. Notwithstanding the law’s embrace of this principle, however, as a practical matter, patent holders are **generally able to recover more** than the **ex ante value** of the patent when litigation occurs after the implementers are locked in. Further, negotiations in the shadow of litigation after lock-in tend to **result in royalties in excess** of the ex ante or **market value** of the patented technology.12

Third, the shadow of litigation is **particularly problematic** in the communications and technology sector, in which products typically include hundreds or **thousands** of **patented technologies**. A court-ordered injunction involving such products would deprive the implementer of not only the value of the technology covered by the patent-in-suit, but also the value of the **entire product**.13 Implementers that are forced to bear the risk of an injunction are thus **induced to agree to royalties** greater than those that would be **appropriate** if only the value of the patented technology were at stake. Those royalties **systematically provide** SEP holders with **excessive compensation** in comparison with the benchmark of ex ante royalties.

These implications of lock-in and ex post dealings are well-understood: they represent an example of the **general concept** of **lock-in** and **opportunism** developed by Oliver Williamson.14 The Federal Circuit has also recognized the market distortions caused by the inclusion of patented technologies in public standards and the resulting danger of patent holdup involving SEPs.15

For these and other reasons, the SEP holder has ex post monopoly power that, if left unchecked, would enable it to obtain royalties **far in excess** of the royalties that it could earn in a competitive market.16 To address this common problem and limit ex post opportunism by SEP holders, SSOs typically require participants that own SEPs to make certain FRAND commitments. In particular, by requiring a commitment to license on “fair and reasonable” terms, the FRAND requirement aims to prevent, or at least reduce, the **extent of monopoly pricing** by SEP holders. And by requiring a commitment to license on “nondiscriminatory” terms, the FRAND requirement can prevent SEP holders from **extracting monopoly premiums** by selective licensing or, more important, migrating their monopoly power from the FRAND-regulated market to unregulated standard-implementing product markets by licensing to only one or a few implementers or licensing to selected implementers on discriminatorily favorable terms.

**Patent holdup is accentuated by the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in *FTC v. Qualcomm* that permits ICT firms to engage in innovation-stifling conduct with antitrust impunity.**

**Moss 20**, \*Alex Moss is a Staff Attorney on EFF’s intellectual property team, before joining EFF, Alex practiced complex commercial litigation at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP in New York and Durie Tangri LLP in San Francisco; (August 26th, 2020, “Throwing Out the FTC's Suit Against Qualcomm Moves Antitrust Law in the Wrong Direction”, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/08/throwing-out-ftcs-suit-against-qualcomm-moves-antitrust-law-wrong-direction)

Standards can enhance **competition** and **consumer choice**, but they also **massively inflate** the **value** of **patents** deemed **essential** to the standard, and give their owners the power to **sue companies** that implement the standard for **money damages** or **injunctions** to block them from using their SEPs. When standards cover critical features like wireless connectivity, SEP owners wield a huge amount of **“hold-up” power** because their patents allow them to effectively **block access** to the **standard** altogether. That lets them charge **unduly large tolls** to anyone who wants to implement the standard.

To minimize that risk, standard-setting organizations typically require companies that want their patented technology incorporated into a standard to promise in advance to license their SEPs to others on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. But that promise strikes at a **key tension** between antitrust and patent law: patent owners have **no obligation** to let anyone use technology their patent covers, but to get those technologies incorporated into standards, patent owners usually have to promise that they will give **permission** to anyone who wants to implement the standard as long as they pay a reasonable license fee.

Qualcomm is one of the most **important** and **dominant** companies in the **history** of **wireless** communication standards. It is a multinational conglomerate that has owned patents on every major wireless communication standard since its first CDMA patent in 1985, and it **participates** in the **s**tandard-**s**etting **o**rganization**s** that define those standards. Qualcomm is somewhat unique in that it not only **licenses SEPs**, but also **supplies** the **modem chips** used by a wide range of devices. These include chips that **implement** wireless communication **standards**, which lie at the **heart** of every mobile **computing device**.

Although Qualcomm promised to license its SEPs (including patents essential to CDMA, 3G, 4G, and 5G) on FRAND terms, its conduct has to many looked **unfair**, **unreasonable**, and **highly discriminatory**. In particular, Qualcomm has drawn scrutiny for bundling tens of thousands of patents together—including many that are **not** standard-**essential**—and offering portfolio-only licenses no matter what licensees actually **want** or **need**; refusing to sell modem chips to anyone without a SEP license and threatening to **withhold chips** from companies trying to **negotiate** different license terms; **refusing** to license anyone other than original-equipment manufacturers (OEMs); and insisting on **royalties** calculated as a **percentage** of the **sale price** of a handset sold to end users for hundreds of dollars, despite the minimal contribution of any particular patent to the retail value.

In 2017, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission [sued](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/01/ftc-charges-qualcomm-monopolizing-key-semiconductor-device-used) Qualcomm for violating both sections of the Sherman Antitrust Act by engaging in a number of anticompetitive SEP licensing practices. In May 2019, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California agreed with the FTC, identifying numerous instances of Qualcomm’s unlawful, anticompetitive conduct in a comprehensive [233-page opinion](https://www.eff.org/document/ftc-v-qualcomm-district-court-opinion). We were pleased to see the FTC take action and the district court credit the overwhelming evidence that Qualcomm’s conduct is corrosive to market-based competition and threatens to cement Qualcomm’s dominance for years to come.

But this month, a panel of judges from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unanimously [overturned](https://www.eff.org/document/ninth-circuit-opinion-ftc-v-qualcomm) the district court’s decision, reasoning that Qualcomm’s conduct was “hypercompetitive” but not “anticompetitive,” and therefore not a violation of antitrust law. To reach that result, the Ninth Circuit made the patent grant more powerful and antitrust law weaker than ever.

According to the Ninth Circuit, patent owners don’t have a duty to let anyone use what their patent covers, and therefore Qualcomm had no duty to license its SEPs to anyone. But that framing requires **ignoring** the **promises** Qualcomm made to license its SEPs on **reasonable** and **non-discriminatory** terms—promises that courts in this country and around the world have **consistently** enforced. It also means ignoring antitrust principles like the essential facilities doctrine, which limits the ability of a monopolist with **hold-up power** over an **essential facility** (like a port) to **shut out** rivals. Instead, the Ninth Circuit held rather simplistically that a duty to deal could arise only if the monopolist had provided access, and then reversed its policy.

But even when Qualcomm restricted its licensing policies in critical ways, the Ninth Circuit found reasons to approve those restrictions. For example, Qualcomm stopped licensing its patents to chip manufacturers and started licensing them only to OEMs. This had a major benefit: it let Qualcomm charge a much **higher royalty rate** based on the **high retail price** of the end user devices, like smartphones and tablets, that OEMs make and sell. If Qualcomm had continued to license to chip suppliers, its patents would be “**exhausted**” once the chips were sold to OEMs, extinguishing Qualcomm’s right to assert its patents and control how the chips were used.

Patent exhaustion is a century-old doctrine that protects the rights of consumers to use things they buy without getting the patent owner’s permission again and again. Patent exhaustion is important because it **prevents price-gouging**, but also because it protects **space** for **innovation** by letting people **use things** they buy **freely**, including to build innovations of their own. The doctrine thus helps patent law serve its underlying goal—promoting economic **growth** and **innovation**. In other words, the doctrine of exhaustion is baked into the patent grant; it is not optional. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit wholeheartedly approved of Qualcomm’s efforts to avoid **exhaustion**—even when that meant **cutting off** access to **previous licensees** (chip-makers) in ways that let Qualcomm charge **far more** in **licensing fees** than its SEPs **could possibly** have **contributed** to the **retail value** of the **final product**.

It makes **no sense** that Qualcomm could **contract around** a fundamental principle like patent **exhaustion**, but at the same time **did not assume** any **antitrust duty** to deal under these circumstances. Worse, it’s **harmful** for the **economy**, **innovation**, and **consumers**. Unfortunately, the kind of harm that antitrust law recognizes is limited to harm affecting “competition” or the “competitive process.” Antitrust law, at least as the Ninth Circuit interprets it, doesn’t do nearly enough to address the **harm** downstream consumers experience when they pay **inflated** prices for high-tech devices, and miss out on **innovation** that might have developed from fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licensing practices.

We hope the FTC sticks to its guns and asks the Ninth Circuit to go en banc and reconsider this decision. Otherwise, antitrust law will become an even **weaker weapon** against **innovation-stifling conduct** in **technology markets.**

**Weakened antitrust enforcement emboldens firms to follow Qualcomm’s lead, which collapses FRAND integrity.**

**Hovenkamp 20**, \*Herbert J. Hovenkamp is James G. Dinan University Professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania; (2020, “FRAND and Antitrust”, <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3095&context=faculty_scholarship>)

While the FRAND process has been highly productive, it is also **fragile**. Firms are tempted to make commitments at the beginning when the incentive to join is large, but **renege** on them **later** when they can profit by doing so. At least in this particular case, private FRAND enforcement **had not worked** very well. Qualcomm had been able to violate FRAND commitments in order to **exclude rivals** and obtain **higher royalties** than FRAND would permit, largely with **impunity**. Other firms will very likely **follow Qualcomm’s lead**. If that happens the **FRAND system** will **fall apart**, doing **irreparable injury** to the modern wireless telecommunications network or, at the very least, **diminishing** the **leadership role** of the United States in preserving effective **network competition**.

While governments can be heavily involved in standard set-ting,9 the implementation of technical standards in information technologies is largely the work of private actors. Government involvement is limited mainly to enforcement of contract, intellectual property, or antitrust law. As private actors, those involved in standard setting or compliance are fully subject to the federal antitrust laws.

This Article addresses one question: when is an SSO participant’s violation of a FRAND commitment an antitrust violation, and if it is, of what kind and what are the implications for remedies? It warns against two extremes. One is thinking that any violation of a FRAND commitment is an antitrust violation as well. In the first instance FRAND obligations are contractual, and most breaches of contract do not violate any antitrust law. The other extreme is thinking that, because a FRAND violation is a breach of contract, it cannot also be an antitrust violation. The question of an antitrust violation does not de-pend on whether the conduct breached a particular agreement but rather on whether it caused competitive harm. This can happen because the conduct restrained trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act, was unreasonably exclusionary under section 2 of the Sherman Act, or amounted to an anticompetitive condition or understanding as defined by section 3 of the Clay-ton Act.10 The end goal is to identify practices that harm com-petition, thereby injuring consumers.

The Ninth Circuit’s Qualcomm decision will make antitrust violations in the context of FRAND licensing much more **difficult to prove**, even in cases where **anticompetitive behavior** and consumer harm **seem clear**.11 Indeed, in this case the court itself acknowledged the harm to consumers but appeared to think that they were not entitled to protection.12 If this decision stands, FRAND obligations will to a **larger extent** have to be settled through private litigation and the federal antitrust enforcement agencies will have a **diminished role**. Anticompetitive behavior by one firm that is **not effectively disciplined** will lead **others** to do the **same thing**.

**A trusted and credible system for ICT innovation is critical to rapid tech diffusion and economic growth---absent FRAND, the system will collapse.**

**Bauer et al. 17**, \*Matthias Bauer is Senior Economist at ECIPE; \*Fredrik Erixon is a Swedish economist and writer. He has been the Director of the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) ever since its start in 2006; (October 2017, “Standard Essential Patents and the Quest for Faster Diffusion of Technology”, https://ecipe.org/publications/standard-essential-patents/)

It is easy to take a **pessimistic view** about whether the system will **break**. If the current trend continues, the system is **likely** to break at **some point** for the simple reason that companies will **not trust it** anymore. The series of legal disputes witnessed over the past years – sometimes referred to as the “smartphone patent wars” – has been fodder for a pessimistic reading of “the two tales of SEPs”. While it is common in the business world that disputes over patents and licenses are settled in courts, various SEP disputes have revealed **problematic** aspects of the SEP market that are different from those disputes that follow the normal stream of business and contracts. Often, the SEP disputes are less concerned about the rights and boundaries of patents, and more about **antitrust limits** to market **behavior**: they concern market **abusive practices** and **restrictions** to **competition** as much as they are about intellectual property.

If the SEP system actually **does break** at some point, the consequences would be **felt** throughout the **economy**. SEPs have been a **critical part** of the ICT revolution. SEPs have allowed for the **fast rates** of innovation **diffusion** that the world has witnessed over the **past quarter** of a **century**. All the computer and Internet related products and services that people are now dependent upon for their private and professional lives are **intricate webs** of intellectual property. As many as 250,000 patents can be used to claim ownership of some technical specification or design element in a single smartphone (NYT 2012). A laptop, suggests one calculation, implements more than 250 interoperability standards (Biddle et al. 2010), and the number of SEP holders for 3G and 4G standards grew from 2 in 1994 to 130 in 2013 while the number of SEPs rose from fewer than 150 in 1994 to more than 150,000 in 2013 (Galetovic and Gupta 2016). The standardization-body ETSI has registered more than 150,000 declarations of SEPs from companies, and ETSI is just one of many bodies in the world of ICT standardization. For the 3G standard, the same body has about 24,000 patents that have been declared essential. Now, with the economy yet again on the **threshold** of big technological change, a **trusted** and **credible system** for creators and users of technology to standardize proprietary technology would be a boon for **innovation**, **interoperability** and – ultimately – the **consumers**.

And there are reasons for optimism. Although many of the problems in the SEP regimes need to be addressed, the numbers above indicate that the SEP system is in fact attractive to patent holders and SEP implementers. It is easy to see why: neither holders nor implementers are presented with alternative options that on the face of it would be far more profitable for them. In other words, there simply would not be as many patents declared as essential if both creators and users of technology believed the SEP system worked to their disadvantage or was grossly unfair. While the reality for some companies may be that legal disputes and unpredictability prompt them to find other ways than SEPs to get access to key technologies for their products, it remains the case that most stakeholders have strong economic incentives to maintain a balanced SEP system that is trusted.

First, standard essential patents are an asset for creators of technology because, by becoming **essential** to a standard, their volumes of sales for technologies that users value rise **significantly**. As many holders want to raise more revenues for their SEPs and – ideally – have the freedom to contract with buyers on their terms, they can expand their customer base when they agree to sell patented technology in accordance with a set of rules that are designed to prevent SEP holders exploiting the weakness of a customer that has grown dependent on having access to their technology.

Second, SEPs are hugely **beneficial** also to those that buy the licenses – the implementers or users. Through the SEP system, they can access technologies that are **interoperable** and work with different **products** and **functionalities** – and they can do it under conditions that, if history is a guide, in most cases give them stable and predictable terms of contract. As a consequence, both creators and users can focus on their competitive advantages and profit on the economies of scale and specialization. Downstream firms do not need to develop their own upstream technology and upstream firms do not need to package their technologies in end-customer products in order to make their products valuable.

Third, standard-setting organisations (SSOs) also have a big stake in an SEP system that works well – and, like creators and users of technology, they would stand to lose significantly if the SEP system were to collapse.

Lastly, the biggest beneficiaries are individual consumers – those who buy the end products using FRAND-conditioned SEPs. The advent of SEPs and the rules represented by FRAND have enabled a **development** of fast technology creation and contributed to the **rapid diffusion** in ICT goods and ICT-based services. The SEP system has also allowed for new competition, both between existing technologies and brands, and from new ones that have stepped into the market with the ambition to disrupt it, again to the benefit of the consumer. It is **difficult** to imagine that the ICT and digital **development** would have been as **fast** as it has been if SEPs had not been a **central feature** of the **market**.

The changing fortunes of companies operating in the cellular and smartphone market would not have been possible if there had not been an SEP system that supported competition. Now that the **world economy** is on the **doorstep** of new innovations that are dependent on a great number of input technologies – e.g. the Internet-of-Things, transport connectivity and intelligent vehicles – it is **crucially important** for the consumer that a **balanced** and **functioning** SEP system is maintained and that actors in the system **converge** towards it – which would ultimately **meet** their **economic interests**.

**ICT innovation is key to post-COVID economic recovery and long-term growth.**

**van Ark 21**, \*Bart van Ark is a Senior Advisor of the Economy, Strategy and Finance (ESF) Center at The Conference Board; Bart van Ark, \*Klaas de Vries is an economist with The Conference Board; \*Abdul Erumban is an assistant professor at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands and a senior research fellow at The Conference Board; (2021, “HOW TO NOT MISS A PRODUCTIVITY REVIVAL ONCE AGAIN”, https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/nie.2020.49)

Introduction

As the global economy has entered recession in 2020, triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, the human casualties, and economic **damage** are perceived to be **very large**. Even as the health crisis will gradually become manageable, the impact on economic growth can be **long-lasting** and the recovery path can take several **years**. In particular, growth drivers such as the pace of job creation, income generation and investment may take several years to get back to pre-crisis trends. Initially the productivity of those growth drivers may be of less concern as the mantra of ‘we’ll do what it takes to avoid worse’ is predominant in this phase of the crisis.

However, once the recovery gets underway the **productive** use of **resources** is key to **sustained** growth. While we do not ignore the short-term challenges of the economic recovery, our primary focus in this paper is on the productivity puzzle from a **long-term** perspective. Productivity is driven by technological **change** and **innovation** which, in turn, depends on **investment** in human and physical capital as well as in other ‘missing capitals’ often referred to as intangible assets. Indeed, those investments create a **positive feedback** effect, as the productivity it generates also helps to make more **efficient** usage of **scarce** resources in the future. When properly measured and valued, productivity also provides a critical yardstick to realise a fairer distribution of the gains from economic growth to those who bring the resources to bear. It thereby creates the incentives for people to produce and business to invest helping to drive economic growth and raise living standards.

Unfortunately, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008/2009, many economies around the world, especially advanced economies, have failed to recharge the economy by powering productivity as the key source of growth in the long term. Indeed the latest update of The Conference Board Total Economy Database (July 2020) points at significant weakening in labor productivity growth in Europe up to 2019 (figure 1a–c). While the United States experienced somewhat faster productivity growth from 2017 to 2019 than the Euro Area and the United Kingdom, it still has **not recovered** to the rates of productivity growth from before the global financial crisis either.

The slowdown in productivity growth over the past 15 years has been well documented. There are multiple causes including an exhaustion of catch-up potential in emerging markets impacting economies along entire global value chains, and the drag from the global financial crisis because of low demand and weak investment, too low interest rates causing misallocations an overreliance on cheap labor, and failing fiscal policies (Bauer et al., 2020; Cette et al., 2016; Crafts, 2018; Dieppe, 2020; Fernald et al., 2017; Syverson, 2016).1 Technical measurement issues regarding inputs and outputs may have played a role as well.

In our earlier work we have stressed the importance of time lags in the adoption of new technologies, and in particular the complexity in generating productivity growth from the latest round of new digital technologies since the early 2010s, including the move toward mobile, ubiquitous access to broadband, the rise of cloud storage and advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics (van Ark, 2016a, 2016b; van Ark and O’Mahony, 2016; van Ark et al., 2016).

While the first priority for economic recovery from the COVID-19 crisis is to restore jobs, it is important that any employment-intensive growth path does go together with a **productivity revival**. In this paper, we argue that it is possible to avoid another productivity **slowdown**. Underneath the aggregate figures, there is evidence pointing toward a possible **tipping point** at which many advanced economies may expect to see more **widespread** impacts from the adoption and absorption of **digital technology** on **productivity** and GDP **growth**.

In Section 2 we review the latest literature on the productivity impacts of general purpose technologies (GPTs), including the notion of time lapses through which digital technologies result in faster productivity growth. We also look at patterns by which innovation and productivity effects GPTs emerge across industries and disperse across the economy. We explain why the New Digital Economy (NDE) is especially characterised by long lag effects.

In Section 3 we provide an empirical analysis of productivity growth by industry data to observe whether we can detect a distinct pattern across groups of industries pointing to a structural improvement in recent years. We use a taxonomy on digital intensity by industry which was recently developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Calvino et al., 2018), showing that the most digital-intensive industries have experienced a relatively strong performance in terms of labor productivity growth since 2007 and especially since 2013.

In Section 4 of the paper, we discuss the connection between labor and skills in the digital economy, which we believe provides the key to a productivity revival. We developed a new metric on innovation competencies by occupation on the basis of data from the O\*Net database on occupation-specific descriptors in the United States (Hao et al., 2018). When applied to the United Kingdom, we find that innovation competencies point at stronger productivity effects by industry.

In Section 5 we focus on how productivity has been behaving in the short-term during the COVID-19 recession. In particular, we address the potential trade-offs between traditional pro-cyclical recovery effects and scarring effects the recession leaves, especially on the labor market. We argue that increased adoption and usage of digital technologies during the COVID-19 crisis may create a positive productivity effect. In the final section, Section 6, we will review our hypothesis that a productivity revival could be imminent in the light of the recovery from the COVID-19 crisis. In order **not to miss** this **opportunity** again, as happened a decade ago, we argue that a coordinated effort from business and policy is needed, and has to be delivered in such a way that the gains from productivity will be more **widespread** and such that those who provide the resources for growth are incentivised to deliver them in an efficient way.

2. The productivity paradox of the New Digital Economy

It is well known that General Purpose Technologies (GPTs), defined as new methods of producing and inventing new goods and services which are important enough to have a long-term aggregate impact on the economy, can take a significant amount of time to translate to faster **productivity** growth at the **aggregate level** of the economy. This is inherent to the three critical characteristics of a GPT as identified by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995).2

1. Pervasiveness –The GPT should spread to most sectors.

2. Improvement –The GPT should get better over time and, hence, should keep lowering the costs of its users.

3. Innovation spawning –The GPT should make it easier to invent and produce new products or processes.

Historical analysis has focussed on productivity trends in previous technology phases (Bakker et al., 2019; Crafts, 2004). Recent literature has shown that the information and communication technology (ICT) revolution of the past 50 years can be characterised as a GPT and doesn’t pale with previous GPTs such as steam technology, electricity and the combustion engine. For example, Hempell (2005) concludes that ‘investment in information and communication technologies (ICT) are **closely linked** to **complementary** innovations and are most **productive** in firms with experience from earlier innovations’. In a more recent analysis of the evolution of the Internet, Simcoe (2015) argues that the modularity of the internet has prevented a **fall** in **return** to **investments** in **innovation** by ‘facilitating low-cost **adaptation** of a shared general-purpose technology to the demands of heterogeneous applications’. In a review of the data, Liao et al. (2016) conclude that:

‘...ICT investment does **contribute** to **productivity** but not in the usual manner –we find a positive (but lagged) ICT effect on technological progress. We argue that for a positive ICT role on growth to actually take place, a period of negative relationship between productivity and ICT investment together with ICT-using sectors’ capacity to learn from the embodied new technology was crucial. In addition, it took a learning period with appropriate complementary co-inventions for the new ICT-capital to become effective and its gains to be realised. Our findings provide **solid**, further **empirical evidence** to support ICT as a general purpose technology’.

**Growth solves nuclear war.**

**Henricksen 17**, \*Thomas H., emeritus senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; (March 23rd, 2017, “Post-American World Order,” Hoover Institution, <http://www.hoover.org/research/post-american-world-order>)

What Is To Be Done?

The first marching order is to dodge any kind of perpetual war of the sort that George Orwell outlined in  “1984,” which engulfed the three super states of Eastasia, Eurasia, and Oceania, and made possible the totalitarian Big Brother regime. A long-running Cold War-type confrontation would almost certainly take another form than the one that ran from 1945 until the downfall of the Soviet Union.

What prescriptions can be offered in the face of the escalating competition among the three global powers? First, by staying militarily and **economically strong**, the United States will have the resources to deter its peers’ **hawkish behavior** that might otherwise trigger a **major conflict**. Judging by the history of the Cold War, the coming strategic **chess match** with Russia and China will prove **tense** and **demanding**—since all the countries boast **nuclear arms** and long-range ballistic missiles. Next, the United States should widen and sustain willing coalitions of partners, something at which America excels, and at which China and Russia fail conspicuously.

There can be **little room** for **error** in **fraught crises** among **nuclear-weaponized** and hostile powers. Short- and long-term standoffs are likely, as they were during the Cold War. Thus, the playbook, in part, involves a **waiting game** in which each power looks to its rivals to suffer grievous internal problems which could entail a **collapse**, as happened to the Soviet Union.

Some Chinese and Russian experts predict grave domestic problems for each other. They also entertain **similar** thoughts about the United States, which they view as terminally decadent and catastrophically polarized over politics, ethnicity, and the future direction of the country. So, the brewing three-way struggle also involves a **systemic contest**, which will test the competitors’ **economic** and **political institutions**.

At this juncture, the world is entering a standoff among the three great and several not-so-great powers. Averting war, while defending our interests, will prove a challenge, calling for deft policy, political endurance, and **economic growth**, as well as sufficient military force to **keep at bay** aggressive states or **prevail** over them if ever a war breaks out.

**Emergence of smart cities depends on IoT applications of 5G interoperability standards---absent FRAND, excessive royalties will undermine sustainable development.**

**Schwartz 18**, \*Matt Schwartz, Privacy Fellowship Coordinator at ACT, App Association; (March 2nd, 2018, “It’s Smart to be FRANDly: How the FRAND Commitment Will Determine the Future of Smart Cities”, https://actonline.org/2018/03/02/its-smart-to-be-frandly-how-the-frand-commitment-will-determine-the-future-of-smart-cities/)

In December, we [outlined](https://actonline.org/2017/12/18/smart-cities-connecting-your-community-through-technology/%5d) the emergence of **Smart Cities** – cities that harness technological **innovations** like internet of things (**IoT**) devices and data analytics to improve essential infrastructure in growing urban centers. The technological foundation of Smart Cities aims to improve public safety, better allocate resources, and meet the needs of citizens more quickly.

A central element to Smart Cities is the comprehensive network of sensors and devices implemented within buildings, roads, traffic signs, and parking meters that allows them to interact with public, and potentially private-owned, infrastructure. These sensors will “speak” to one another, communicating information about energy usage, traffic density, or other elements of city management that have traditionally either been analyzed separately or not tracked at all. The potential of Smart Cities allows data to flow from previously disconnected branches of the city and be processed in real-time, unlocking previously unknown insights.

The powerful **interoperability** of Smart Cities will rely heavily on **standardized technologies** developed in organizations like the IEEE, which is responsible for standardizing the wi-fi technology we use every day. Standardized technologies often include standard-essential patents (**SEPs**), which, like their name suggests, are patents declared essential to an industry standard by a standards-setting organization. In simple terms, one cannot implement the standardized technology without using the patent.

Like regular patents, the users of SEPs must pay royalties or **licensing fees** to the patent owner before they may use it. For example, if a manufacturing company wants to make an IoT device interoperable with a 5G network, the manufacturer must pay a licensing fee to the owner of the SEP that is essential to the 5G standard. SEPs play a **vital role** in the new innovations we enjoy and have come to expect, and because of the value of these patents, SEP holders have the ability to demand **high license fees** from those who wish to implement the standard. To offset this **competition issue**, many SEP holders **voluntarily** agree to license their SEPs to any willing licensee under fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (**FRAND**) terms.

While wi-fi and LTE are standards that will be vital to Smart City deployment, countless new standardized technologies are being developed that will be integral to any fully-operational Smart City. With **reasonable access** to SEPs, assured by the FRAND commitment, innovators can enjoy the **legal** and **business certainty** they need to **compete**. While the meaning of the FRAND commitment continues to be refined – as evidenced by the development of SEP best practices recently launched by the App Association in Europe – its foundations are well-established.

But what happens when SEP holders do not abide by the FRAND licensing commitment, or simply refuse to license at all? Sadly, small and medium-sized companies would be **forced** to accept **untenable** licensing terms, but more realistically, they would be **priced out** of using the standard **altogether**. As a result, it would impose a **barrier** to **innovation** that would result in **fewer products** offered to consumers or cities eager to implement **IoT technologies**. For example, many hope the rise of autonomous vehicles will be seamlessly integrated into the Smart City network. But how beneficial would it be if only some autonomous vehicle brands are able to license the technology needed to communicate with traffic lights, simply because of the market power of a chipmaker? The FRAND commitment is an important backstop to that unfortunate possibility.

It is vital for SEP holders to honor FRAND licensing terms, if not for small and medium-sized innovators, then for the sustainability of future Smart Cities. FRAND creates a platform for innovation, providing a floor on which companies can stand, innovate, and compete. If the foundation of the FRAND commitment is reneged, American innovators pay a **steep price** – not only do they lose a **key component** of product **development** and **market entry**, but they are also left with years of expensive negotiations and litigation if they choose to challenge the licensing practice. What’s more, the **confidence** developed in the open standards development system is **shaken**, and Smart Cities have fewer choices in IoT solutions for their future.

To achieve the promise of Smart Cities, a balanced standards ecosystem is essential. We must allow small and medium-sized developers to **leverage industry standards** for innovation and prevent cost-prohibitive royalty structures and negotiating practices that are **detrimental** to **competition**, while also ensuring that SEP owners can protect their intellectual property and be fairly compensated for its use. The FRAND commitment continues to be the **best framework** to achieve this balance, and **adherence** to its **principles** will determine the **future** and **success** of **Smart Cities**.

**Climate change is anthropogenic and causes extinction---5G-enabled smart cities are critical for mitigation and adaptation.**

**Huseien 21**, \*Ghasan Fahim Huseien is a research fellow at Department of Building, School of Design and Environment, National University of Singapore, Singapore; Dr. Kwok Wei Shah is presently an assistant professor and deputy program director with the Department of Building, School of Design and Environment, National University of Singapore, Singapore; (August 23rd, 2021, “Potential Applications of 5G Network Technology for Climate Change Control: A Scoping Review of Singapore”, https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/17/9720)

Currently, the **entire planet** is at risk due to continual **climate change** [1–3]. The recorded increase in average temperature across the world in the past hundred years, and the associated changes attributed to this, are known as global warming. Many scientists are convinced by the published evidence that this change is **anthropogenic** and resulted from the **elevated emission levels** of global greenhouse gases (GHGs) [4,5]. Gases such as water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and ozone are responsible for the absorption and emission of thermal radiation. These changes in the relative quantities of the GHGs induce a proportional change in the amount of preserved solar energy. Presently, the accepted indicator for global warming is the sustained rise in the mean temperature worldwide. This definition is designed to account for the fact that there may be some localized exceptions to this rise. For example, there may be cooling experienced in a region while the global temperature may increase altogether, hence the need for average temperature. A key concern with the GHGs trapping of more heat in the atmosphere is that it affects both climate and short scale weather patterns. Consequently, it results in **greater numbers** of **adverse weather events** such as storms, heat waves, cold snaps, droughts, and fires [6]. **Climate-related risks** to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human safety, and economic growth are projected to **increase** with global warming of 1.5 ◦C [7] and further increase further at 2 ◦C, as shown in Figure 1. In addition, the risks to global aggregated economic growth due to the climate change impacts are projected to be lower at 1.5 ◦C than at 2 ◦C by the end of this century.

Carbon dioxide has the most **substantial effect** on global warming [8]. Although it was once assumed to have an ~100 year lifespan in the atmosphere, careful studies revealed that the situation is far worse, with three-quarters of the gas expected to remain for a time in the region of up to ~1000 years, with the remainder lasting for an indefinite period of time [9]. It was indicated that the present impacts of humanity on the atmosphere can certainly cause a long term problem [10]. Carbon dioxide is released when oil, coal, and other fossil fuels are burnt for the energy we use to power our homes, cars, and smartphones. By **lessening** its **usage**, we can **curb** our own **contribution** to climate change while saving money. The first challenge is eliminating the burning of coal, oil, and, eventually, natural gas. Oil is the lubricant of the global economy as it is hidden inside such ubiquitous items as plastic and corn, fundamental to the transportation of both consumers and goods. Coal is the substrate, supplying roughly half of the electricity worldwide, a percentage that is likely to grow according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). In fact, buildings contribute up to 43% of all the greenhouse gas emissions worldwide [11], even though investing in thicker insulation and other cost-effective as well as temperature-regulating strategies can save money in the long run. Investment in **new infrastructures**, or radical **upgradation** of the existing highways and transmission lines, may help to **reduce** greenhouse gas **emissions**, yielding economic growth in the developing countries.

Nations across the globe have kept very **high targets** to reducing their GHG discharges [12,13]. In order to meet these goals, **considerable reductions** in city energy usage is required. At a global scale, urban communities represent over half (55%) of the population, which is predicted to reach **68%** by the middle of this century [14]. Urban areas claim ownership of the **highest levels** of energy use, gas emission, and also the largest local economy. As such, it is **crucial** for urban areas to **reduce** their **consumption** and utilize **renewable sources** wherever available to reduce their gas discharge levels. Smart cities often utilize **digital sensors** to measure and transmit data about the levels of GHGs in the city at that moment, as a means of tackling them [15]. The **efficacy** of such a system is thus **reliant** on the network used to collate and analyze the data collected as an extant network. The mobile telecommunications networks offer a **convenient solution** to this desire, as their pre-existence has the clear benefit of reducing costs compared to the design and implementation of a novel system. It is recognized that smart cities will certainly act as the key players meeting these ambitious targets [16,17]. In this study, we focused primarily on the potential applications of 5G network technology to control climate change in Singapore. In addition, a **clear overview** of the **sustainability benefits** of introducing **5G** technology **compatible** smart cities, buildings, and farms in all aspects of urbanization is provided. Herein, the main purpose is to tackle the **negative outcomes** associated with **anthropogenic climate change**, with a particular focus on the contributions that are best made by the telecoms network operators.

Climate change is one of the most **challenging problems** that humanity has ever faced. Presently, hundreds of millions of lives, innumerable species, entire ecosystems, health, economy, and the **future habitability of this planet** are at risk. Fortunately, climate change is **solvable**, we just need to **wisely exploit** the **existing technologies** and **sciences**. Climate change mitigation is a pressing international need in which many management actions are required. The development of 5G technology has been largely driven by smart mobile devices and advanced communication technologies. It may thus serve as a **technical enabler** for a whole new range of business opportunities, energy, and facilities management, together with industrial applications. Moreover, it may enable different devices to work together seamlessly. Definitely, the 5G cellular network technology is expected to **revolutionize** the **global industries** with **profound effects** on the savings of energy, waste generation and recycling, and water resources management, thus **reducing** the **climate change impacts**.

**1AC — Cybersecurity**

**Advantage 2 is Cybersecurity —**

**Aggressive patent strategies create structural flaws in 5G standardization that imperils domestic cybersecurity---market competition reduces the incidence of vulnerability and severity of attacks.**

**Duan 20**, \*Charles Duan is a senior fellow and associate director of tech & innovation policy at the R Street Institute, where he focuses his research on intellectual property issues; (2020, “OF MONOPOLIES AND MONOCULTURES: THE INTERSECTION OF PATENTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY”, Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal, 36(4), 369-405. Retrieved from <https://www2.lib.ku.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/monopolies-monocultures-intersection-patents/docview/2442966690/se-2?accountid=14556>)

III. COMPETITION AND CYBERSECURITY

In addition to the historical review done so far, another approach to understanding the relationship among patents, competition, and national security is to consider the role of **cybersecurity**. There is little doubt that computer system vulnerabilities that enable **hacking** and **spread** of **computer exploits** are a **threat** to the **nation’s defenses**, so better cybersecurity is a **key part** of national security strategy.155

**Strong competition** can thus **complement** national security by enhancing domestic cybersecurity, and **patent assertion** that **unduly weakens** competition **detracts** from cybersecurity.156 Competition promotes better cybersecurity in at least two ways. First, multiple studies show that competition encourages firms to improve their products on multiple vectors including cybersecurity. Second, competition avoids a situation that security experts call a “monoculture,” which increases vulnerability to severe cyberattacks. As former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff wrote recently, “We need **competition** and **multiple providers**, not a potentially vulnerable technological monoculture,” to **guarantee** national security.157 Thus, cybersecurity provides a **useful lens** for understanding how **unfettered** patent assertion and **licensing** can **detract** from **national security**.

A. Cybersecurity as Competitive Value-Add

Competition enhances national security by **reducing** the **incidence** of technical **vulnerabilities**. That effect is **especially important** for security **sensitive systems** such as **mobile telecommunications**.

Intuitively, a **causal chain** from **competition** to **cybersecurity** makes logical sense. Computer security is a value-added benefit to consumers, so firms in competitive markets are likely to use security to gain an edge over their competitors.158 In monopolized markets, though, there may be less **external impetus** to **test products** for flaws, and the **monopolist** may **choose** to **focus less** on **security** and more on new product features or increased product quality.

Economic research confirms these hypotheses about competition leading to better cybersecurity. A 2009 empirical study of web browsers considered the impact of market concentration on the amount of time that vendors took to fix security vulnerabilities as they were discovered.159 The study found that the **presence** of more **competitors** correlated with **faster cybersecurity** response—a reduction of 8–10 days in response time per additional market rival.160 Similarly, business researchers in 2005 modeled incentives for firms to engage in sharing of cybersecurity information, and concluded that the “**inclination** to **share information** and **invest** in **security technologies** increases as the **degree** of **competitiveness** in an industry increases.”161 Another study found that, where two software firms are in competition, at least one will be willing to take on **some degree** of **risk** and **responsibility** for cybersecurity, whereas a monopoly software firm will **consistently fail** to accept such responsibility.162 To be sure, an unpublished study from 2017 found that some market concentration can make firms more responsive to cybersecurity issues, but only to a point: “being in a dominant position reduces the positive effect of having less competitors on the responsiveness of the vendor,” and indeed the “more dominant the firm is, the less rapid it is in releasing security patches.”163 This research confirms that competition is more conducive to cybersecurity.

It is not hard to see how this applies to emerging communication technologies markets. In the absence of competition, the above research suggests that device manufacturers, chip makers, and software developers will **lack incentives** to **respond** to **vulnerabilities**, to **share information** about cybersecurity practices and issues, and to **take responsibility** for security matters. Mobile phone chips have had their share of cybersecurity failures already.164 **The best way to flush out ongoing and future cybersecurity issues is to maintain competitive pressure at all levels of the supply chain.**

B. Vulnerabilities of “Monocultures”

A second reason why monopoly undermines cybersecurity is that monopoly leads to a “**monoculture**” of single-vendor products, opening the door to **massive** systemic **failure** in the case of a **cyberattack**. Computer researchers developed the theory of software monocultures in the early 2000s, in response to the regular phenomenon of computer viruses and other attacks spreading rapidly by exploiting flaws in the dominant operating system at the time, Microsoft Windows.165 Where a computer system such as Windows has a commanding share of users, a virus that **exploits** a **flaw** in that system can quickly **spread** to **infect** a whole **interconnected ecosystem**. An operating system monopoly thus enables fast and easy spread of cyberattacks, and better cybersecurity would be achieved through greater diversity in online systems.166 As one research group posited, “a network architecture that **supports** a collection of **heterogeneous network** elements for the same **functional capability** offers a **greater possibility** of **surviving** security **attacks** as compared to **homogeneous networks**.”167

There has been considerable study of the theory that computer monocultures are **naturally** more **vulnerable** to attacks.168 In one study, computer science researchers reviewed a catalog of 6,340 software vulnerabilities recorded in 2007, to compare whether comparable software would share the same flaws.169 Of the 2,627 vulnerabilities applicable to application software (as opposed to operating systems, web scripts, and other software components), only 29 (1.1%) applied to substitute products from different vendors but providing the same functionality.170 By contrast, different versions of a single software product were found to share vulnerabilities 84.7% of the time.171 Thus, software monocultures share **exploitable flaws** even when there is some **variation** in **versions** across the **monoculture**; by contrast, diversity in software is almost **guaranteed** to **prevent** a **single flaw** from **affecting** all **users**.

In the case of 5G and wireless mobile communications, a monoculture is an **especially concerning** possibility. To the extent that systems such as smart city sensors or communication networks are **widely deployed** in a monoculture fashion, a **widespread attack** could have **devastating** consequences, potentially blacking out a region and affecting essential services such as 911.172 A monoculture that is vulnerable to so-called “**rootkits**” or “**backdoors**”—maliciously installed software that enable **bad actors** to commandeer systems—could also enable **mass surveillance** or **spying** by private hackers or foreign governments.173 The presence of systems from **multiple vendors** would mitigate these possibilities.

The monoculture theory is not without critics, but a review of those criticisms shows them to be inapplicable to contemporary communication technologies. Some critics suggest that software diversity imposes **unwarranted costs** on firms who must **forego** economies of scale and devise seemingly duplicative yet different setups of computer systems.174 But those concerns **largely focus** on the situation where a **single firm** produces and manages heterogeneous systems, concerns that are **avoided** where **heterogeneity** arises **naturally** through **competition** between two **unrelated** firms. Critics also argue that technological measures can create “artificial diversity” through automated randomization of software code, so software engineers can purportedly solve monoculture issues and device users need not worry about the issue.175 But even these critics acknowledge that artificial diversity techniques are often **insufficient** because they must make **assumptions** about what **aspects** of the **technology** are **most vulnerable** to **attack**, and they **concede** that artificial diversity **cannot stop** attacks involving operation of **legitimate** software functions in **undesirable** ways (sending spam emails or deleting document files, for example).176

It is widely recognized that a monoculture is **unavoidable** in at least one respect: Most connected devices will need to **conform** to technical **standards**.177 5G, for example, is a technical standard developed by a private industry consortium called 3GPP.178 A **flaw** in any such standard would render **all mobile devices** implementing the standard **vulnerable** to an **identical attack**.179 Avoiding these sorts of **systemic flaws** in standards requires rigorous **development**, **analysis**, and **testing** of the standard in the development process, which in turn requires ensuring that **as many firms** as **possible**, especially firms that share basic American values, are **involved** in the **development** of those **standards**.180 Thus, the necessary **standardization** of **information** and **communication technologies** is perhaps the most **important reason** why a **competitive** communication technology **market** is **essential** to **cybersecurity** and national security.

**Insecure technical standards cause inevitable systemic grid collapse---extinction.**

**DeNardis 21**, \*Dr. Laura DeNardis, PhD in Science and Technology Studies from Virginia Tech, Dean of the School of Communication at American University, and Gordon M. Goldstein, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, (March 1st, 2021, “The Real Lesson of the Texas Power Debacle”, Lawfare, 3/1/2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/real-lesson-texas-power-debacle)

The infrastructure was essential, ubiquitous and providing basic functionality for everything in daily life from water to heat and transportation. And in an instant it was gone, plunging tens of thousands of residents into a life-threatening crisis. This is, of course, the narrative of the recent debacle in Texas, where a winter storm overwhelmed the state’s electrical grid and brought the state to a near-total blackout. But it should also be interpreted as a preemptive **warning** of what Americans will face from the next generation of the **internet** and the new realm of cybersecurity risk it will **dramatically** amplify.

Both forms of infrastructure—a state-run electrical grid and the **5G** and “**internet of things**” future to which we are rapidly hurtling—share three attributes. First, their construction reflects a lack of imagination about the danger that can quickly **coalesce** when seemingly remote threat scenarios become real. Second, compounding a lack of analytic imagination is an absence of preparedness. Third, for both the Texas electrical grid and the emerging internet, public policy protections are either meager or completely absent.

In planning for the resilience of its electrical grid, public officials in Texas **discounted** the potentially devastating disruption that could occur from **unpredictable** events—whether related to climate change or just a once-a-century anomaly. They also eschewed precautions other states take seriously by allowing for the interconnection of electrical grid supply chains across their borders, ostensibly because of their ideological rejection of federal regulatory oversight governing such arrangements.

As the United States builds out a new national **5G** cyber-physical communications network through private service providers, Americans similarly **discount** the **risks**—myriad in their diversity and severity—that are **orders** of **magnitude** more **significant** than what Texas confronted recently. More physical things than people are already connected. The super empowered internet of tomorrow, known among some in the field as the “internet of everything,” will exceed by **tens of billions** of devices the number of connections between individuals simply communicating via social media or digital screens.

This confronts policymakers with an imminent threat: A cyber outage is **no longer** about losing digital communications but about losing basic **societal functioning** and even **human life**. The failure of imagination is to think of the SolarWinds attack on U.S. federal agencies and tech companies as a **worst-case scenario**. The failure of imagination is to think of cybersecurity through a content-centric lens rather than as possible attacks on the material world. The emergence of internet-connected cardiac devices, digitally dependent cars, and internet-connected agriculture systems portend the stakes of a cyberattack to **health care**, economic and **social functioning**, and **food security.**

The United States should be prepared for, and certainly not be caught by surprise by, such cyberattacks. Yet, the internet of everything is notoriously **insecure**. Internet-connected physical objects are not necessarily upgradeable. Nor do they come with adequate default security and encryption. The 5G infrastructure that helps connect digital objects has been at the center of debates over Chinese espionage. Industrial cyber-physical **systems** are based on **technical standards** that have not been collaboratively vetted for **security** and **interoperability**. One of the most infamous cyberattacks—the so-called Mirai botnet that took down major media sites and corporations—hijacked these insecure objects in homes to carry out the assault. The United States is not yet prepared.

Finally, in the race to conceive and deploy effective public policy responses, the U.S. government as a whole is hardly more anticipatory or synthesized in its response to potential calamity than the state of Texas. The focus of U.S. cyber policy remains on information policy issues such as disinformation, manipulation and violent speech rather than securing the digital world that now powers our material day-to-day lives. The Biden administration confronts an enormous challenge in crafting a comprehensive strategy to the cybersecurity risks foreshadowed by the ruinous experience in Texas and its management of vital infrastructure. While the digital world has leapt from two-dimensional to three-dimensional space, cyber policy has not at all jumped from 2D to 3D.

This failure of imagination, preparedness and policy protection must not be America’s cyber future; the stakes are far **too high** and the costs are far **too great.** The Texas disaster is a potent illustration of what has always been true: Our digital society and economy are extremely vulnerable and grow more porous and subject to penetration day by day. As digital sensors and cyber control systems become further embedded in physical infrastructure like energy systems, agriculture and transportation, there is no longer a separation between security of the **“real” world** and security of the **online world**. They are **entangled** and increasingly **enmeshed**—and policy has yet to catch up to either envisioning or mitigating the looming threats the U.S. confronts.

If the energy grid cannot weather a winter storm, how can it be expected to withstand a major cyberattack? What other vital forms of national infrastructure—ranging from water, bridges, highways and roads, and ultimately our day-to-day financial system—are **comparably** at **risk**? As Texas dramatizes, it is neither **hyperbolic** nor **exaggerated** to assert that **our survival** could now depend on **securing** the inevitable **cyber-physical future** that is accelerating with **stunning rapidity**.

#### Cyberwar is increasingly likely---SolarWind emboldens hackers to undermine critical infrastructure and nuclear supply chains.

Bajema 21, \*Dr. Natasha Bajema is the Director of the [Converging Risks Lab at the Council on Strategic Risks](https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/programs/csw/dr-natasha-bajema/) and an IEEE Spectrum contributor. She has held long-term assignments at the National Defense University, in the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, and at the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration; (March 24th, 2021, “Today's Cyberattacks Foreshadow Wars to Come”, https://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/aerospace/military/todays-cyberattacks-foreshadow-wars-to-come)

Cyberattacks are no longer just a matter of cybersecurity, they directly threaten a country’s national security. Cyberattacks alter the character of warfare—much like nuclear weapons once did, allowing adversaries to potentially cross enemy lines to harm large numbers of innocent civilians.

Today’s malicious actors can now seek to cause physical damage from remote locations through digital channels, wreaking devastation on a country at levels that previously would have required a kinetic attack.

On February 8, 2021, hackers breached the Bruce T. Haddock Water Treatment Plant in Oldsmar, Fla. using known software vulnerabilities in an attempt to poison the local water supply with sodium hydroxide—also known as lye. They accessed the plant through its industrial control system (ICS)—a system designed to allow for remote control and supervision of the plant. Taking over the plant’s controls, hackers increased parts of the chemical, used to [adjust the acidity and remove metals from drinking water](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/senate-intel-chairman-florida-water-plant-cyberattack), to one hundred times over the normal level. The system used an [old version of Windows, was accessible with a shared password, and had no firewall protection against intrusions](https://techgenix.com/florida-water-treatment-facility-cyberattack/). Thankfully, [a supervisor noticed the dangerous change in time whilst working remotely](https://www.govtech.com/em/safety/Cyberattack-on-Water-Treatment-Facility-Suggests-More-to-Come.html), averting a crisis that may have caused chemical burns and blindness among those exposed to the toxic chemical.

U.S. government officials have recently expressed concerns about similar vulnerabilities across water and energy sectors and other critical infrastructure including [health, emergency services, food and agriculture, and transportation systems](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/senate-intel-chairman-florida-water-plant-cyberattack). The cyberattack on the water plant occurred just a week before a major winter storm led to a widespread blackout and water crisis across Texas. [More than five million](https://time.com/5939633/texas-power-outage-blackouts/) went without power and running water for several days, illustrating the fragility of such interconnected infrastructure and the physical devastation that could be caused in the event of a cyberattack targeting the grid.

Critical infrastructure is not alone in its vulnerabilities to cyberattacks with physical implications—supply chains are also at risk. For at least a span of months (if not years), hackers have [exploited vulnerabilities](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_United_States_federal_government_data_breach) in software from Microsoft, VMWare and the Texas-based company [SolarWinds](https://www.solarwinds.com/) to compromise data security in at least 200 organizations in the U.S. government and other agencies around the world.

Although the SolarWinds attack appears to be a [case of classic espionage by Russia](https://www.securityinfowatch.com/cybersecurity/article/21206223/more-questions-than-answers-as-solarwinds-breach-probe-expands) via the U.S. supply chain, there are aspects of the attack that also illustrate the potential for achieving physical effects via digital channels. As early as [March 2020](https://www.securityinfowatch.com/cybersecurity/article/21206223/more-questions-than-answers-as-solarwinds-breach-probe-expands), Russian hackers breached the Orion network management software designed by SolarWinds, a federal contractor, and planted malicious code likely intended to gain access to sensitive information. Evidence of malware was first detected [in December by a cybersecurity company](https://www.newsweek.com/colorado-representative-says-solarwinds-hack-could-cyber-equivalent-pearl-harbor-1555994) that also uses the Orion software. The impact of the SolarWinds cyberattack spanned [thousands of networks](https://www.securityinfowatch.com/cybersecurity/article/21206223/more-questions-than-answers-as-solarwinds-breach-probe-expands) at [nine federal agencies and 100 private sector companies](https://www.cyberscoop.com/solarwinds-cyber-espionage-russia-neuberger/), including the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which is responsible for overseeing the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.

Although NNSA claims there was no impact to classified systems, officials found [evidence of attempted intrusion](http://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/22/nuclear-weapons-agency-congress-hacking-450184) in unclassified systems—although, according to the NNSA Public Affairs office, the system in question was used for business purposes, not for transport of nuclear weapons and materials. The agency also detected attempts to gain access to servers at the Los Alamos National Laboratory—one of three nuclear weapons labs. [NNSA immediately disconnected the software from relevant networks](https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-update-cyber-incident-related-solar-winds-compromise), removing the possibility for deleterious effects. While hackers were not likely targeting the transport of nuclear weapons, the [vulnerabilities of nuclear weapons](https://www.nap.edu/read/11538/chapter/6#112) [while en-route](https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1409912) [between secure locations](https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1348_web.pdf) are well known.

The exact objectives for the SolarWinds cyberattack remain unclear, but the vast extent of its reach may demonstrate to U.S. adversaries the significant potential of cyberattacks for achieving physical ends, including the possibility of stealing nuclear weapons. However, the incident is not the first major one from which malicious actors have deduced such capabilities—[consider the lessons from the NotPetya attack in 2017](https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/computing/it/notpetya-latest-ransomware-is-a-warning-note-from-the-future). Russian hackers spread malicious code through a popular accounting software developed by a Ukrainian business across many countries in Europe, eventually infecting tens of thousands of computers around the world. In addition to rendering infected computers useless, the attack shut down the global operations of the Maersk shipping company and caused major traffic congestion on the roads near ports in the United States. It also slowed operations of Merck & Co, Inc., a major producer of drugs and vaccines in the U.S., [reducing production capacity for a short period of time](https://www.fiercepharma.com/manufacturing/merck-has-hardened-its-defenses-against-cyber-attacks-like-one-last-year-cost-it). Even a classic espionage or sabotage incident may carry significant potential for physical damage.

The [Biden administration has already issued guidance](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/02/24/executive-order-on-americas-supply-chains/) for shoring up vulnerabilities in U.S. supply chains, but much more needs to be done to protect critical infrastructure and dissuade malicious actors from exploiting digital channels to achieve physical ends. In an era of hybrid and gray zone warfare, cyberattacks are attractive to nations seeking to undermine their adversaries due to challenges of attribution and the associated benefit of deniability. In the future, these nations may also come to see cyberattacks with physical effects as a new form of warfare—a Trojan horse in the form of their adversary’s own infrastructure or supply chains. In so doing, they can cross enemy lines and cause damage and destruction without defeating any military forces.

**Actors have the means and motivations to strike critical infrastructure.**

**Wintch 21**, \*Timothy M. Wintch, an active-duty Major in the United States Air Force. He is currently a graduate student at the Oettinger School of Science & Technology Intelligence, National Intelligence University, in Bethesda, Maryland. Mr. Wintch has over 11 years of experience in command-and-control operations as an Air Battle Manager. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Politics from the University of California, Santa Cruz, and a Master of Arts in Military Studies from American Military University. (April 20th, 2021, “PERSPECTIVE: Cyber and Physical Threats to the U.S. Power Grid and Keeping the Lights on”, https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/)

Among critical infrastructure sectors in the U.S., energy is perhaps the most crucial of the 16 sectors defined by the Department of Homeland Security. This sector is **so vital** because it provides the energy necessary to run **every other** critical infrastructure sector. However, the U.S. power grid, the backbone of the energy sector, is built upon an aging skeleton that is becoming increasingly **vulnerable** every day. Whether from terrorists or nation-states like Russia and China, the power grid is susceptible to not just physical attacks, but also to **cyber** intrusion as well. However, much of this threat can be mitigated if the U.S. takes the appropriate steps to safeguard the power grid and avoid a potential catastrophe in the future.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, terrorism on U.S. soil has been at the forefront of American consciousness. Critical infrastructure provides an **appealing** target because of the disproportionally **large impact** even a **small attack** can have on the sectors. In particular, the power grid represents a particularly lucrative target, both in terms of the ease of access and the large impact it can make. The National Research Council stated that the U.S. power grid is “vulnerable to intelligent multi-site attacks by knowledgeable attackers intent on causing maximum physical damage to key components on a wide geographical scale.”[[1]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn1) Additionally, the physical security of transmission and distribution systems is difficult due to the **dispersed** nature of these key components, which in turn is advantageous to attackers as it reduces the likelihood of their capture.[[2]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn2) From 2002-2012, approximately 2,500 physical attacks occurred against transmission lines and towers worldwide and approximately 500 attacks against transformer substations.[[3]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn3) Terrorists have the **motivation** to attack the U.S. power grid but the very nature of the grid makes it highly vulnerable. The power grid is not only at risk from physical attacks, but also nation-state cyberattacks.

One nation that has shown both the **capability** and **intent** to use attacks against critical energy infrastructure is Russia, as demonstrated in their 2015 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. A Russian cyber threat group known as Sandworm, which used its BlackEnergy malware, attacked Ukrainian computer systems that provide remote control of the Ukraine power grid.[[4]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn4) This attack, and another in 2016, each left the capital Kiev without power, prompting cyber experts to raise concern about the same malware already existing in NATO and the U.S. power grids.[[5]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn5) In any conflict between Russia and NATO, not only would similar cyberattacks pose a threat, but so would potential physical attacks severing fuel oil and natural gas lines to Western Europe. Russia has both the capability and intent to attack critical infrastructure, particularly power grids, during future conflicts in their “hybrid warfare” approach.

Another nation that has the capability to attack critical energy infrastructure is China, representing a threat to not just the U.S. energy infrastructure but also that of our allies whose support would be vital in a major conflict. A recent NATO report highlighted this threat from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, stating that “[China’s] foreign direct investment in strategic sectors [such as energy generation and distribution] …raises questions about whether access and control over such infrastructure can be maintained, particularly in crisis when it would be required to support the military.”[[6]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn6) Like Russia, China has been **active** with cyber **intrusions** in U.S. energy **infrastructure**. The Mission Support Center at Idaho National Laboratory characterized these as attacks as “multiple intrusions into US ICS/SCADA [Industrial Control Systems/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition] and smart grid tools [that] may be aimed more at intellectual property theft and gathering intelligence to bolster their own infrastructure, but it is likely that they are also using these intrusions to develop capabilities to attack the [**bulk** electric system], as well.”[[7]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn7) China, therefore, has both the **capability** and **intent** to conduct cyber intrusions and attacks for myriad reasons.

Another arm of this threat is the reliance the U.S. energy industry has on imports from China, especially transformers. In early 2020, federal officials seized a transformer in the port of Houston that had been imported by the Jiangsu Huapeng Transformer Company before sending it to Sandia National Laboratory in Albuquerque. Sandia is contracted by the U.S. Department of Energy for mitigating national security threats.[[8]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn8) The Wall Street Journal reported that “Mike Howard, chief executive of the Electric Power Research Institute, a utility-funded technical organization, said that the diversion of a huge, expensive transformer is so unusual – in his experience, unprecedented – that it suggests officials had significant security concerns.”[[9]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn9) Previously destined for the Washington Area Power Administration’s Ault, Colo., substation, the transformer is believed to have been seized due to “backdoor” exploitable hardware emplaced by the Chinese prior to shipment.[[10]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn10) Shortly after these events, President Trump issued Executive Order 13920, “[Securing the United States Bulk-Power System](https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-securing-united-states-bulk-power-system/),” essentially limiting the import of Chinese-built critical energy infrastructure components due to concerns about cybersecurity.[[11]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn11) Interestingly, Jiangsu Huapeng “boasted that it supported 10 percent of New York City’s electricity load.”[[12]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn12)

Franklin Kramer, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, testified before a U.S. House of Representatives Energy and Commerce subcommittee during an energy and power hearing in 2011 and said that a “highly-coordinated and structured cyber, physical, or blended attack on the **bulk power** system, however, could result in long-term (**irreparable**) damage to key system components in multiple simultaneous or near-**simultaneous strikes**.” He added that “an outage could result with the potential to affect a wide geographic area and cause large population centers to lose power for **extended** periods.”[[13]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn13) Even the inclusion of features such as smart grids to the overall grid structure poses new **vulnerabilities** through their connectivity. Kramer stated that “such connectivity means that the **distribution** system could be a **key vector** for a national security attack on the grid.”[[14]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn14)

**Those attacks cause accidental nuclear escalation.**

**Klare 19**, \*Michael T. Klare is a professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association; (November 19th, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation”, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation)

Yet another pathway to escalation could arise from a cascading series of **cyberstrikes** and **counterstrikes** against **vital national infrastructure** rather than on military targets. All major powers, along with Iran and North Korea, have developed and deployed cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary’s key **economic systems**, such as **power grids**, **financial systems**, and **transportation networks**. As noted, Russia has **infiltrated** the U.S. **electrical grid**, and it is widely believed that the United States has done the same in Russia.[12](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote12) The Pentagon has also devised a plan known as “Nitro Zeus,” intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands or, if that approach failed, to pave the way for a crippling air and missile attack.[13](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote12)

The danger here is that **economic attacks** of this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension and crisis, could lead to an **escalating series** of **tit-for-tat attacks** against ever more **vital elements** of an adversary’s critical infrastructure, producing **widespread chaos** and **harm** and eventually leading one side to initiate **kinetic attacks** on **critical** military **targets**, risking the **slippery slope** to **nuclear conflict**. For example, a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on Russian energy and financial systems, causing widespread disorder in both countries and generating an impulse for even more devastating attacks. At some point, such attacks “could lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war.”[14](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote14)

These are by no means the only pathways to escalation resulting from the offensive use of cyberweapons. Others include efforts by **third parties**, such as **proxy states** or **terrorist organizations**, to provoke a global nuclear crisis by causing **early-warning systems** to generate **false readings** (“spoofing”) of missile launches. Yet, they do provide a **clear indication** of the **severity** of the **threat**. As states’ reliance on cyberspace grows and cyberweapons become more powerful, the **dangers** of **unintended** or **accidental escalation** can only grow more **severe**.

**Cyber-compromised NC3 causes nuclear war.**

**Klare 19**, \*Michael T. Klare is a professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association; (November 19th, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation”, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation>)

The Nuclear-Cyber Connection

These links exist because the NC3 systems of the United States and other nuclear-armed states are **heavily dependent** on **computers** and other **digital processors** for virtually **every aspect** of their **operation** and because those systems are **highly vulnerable** to cyberattack. Every nuclear force is composed, most basically, of weapons, early-warning radars, launch facilities, and the top officials, usually presidents or prime ministers, empowered to initiate a nuclear exchange. Connecting them all, however, is an extended network of **communications** and **data-processing** systems, all reliant on **cyberspace**. Warning systems, ground- and space-based, must constantly watch for and analyze possible enemy missile launches. Data on actual threats must rapidly be **communicated** to decision-makers, who must then weigh possible responses and **communicate** chosen outcomes to launch facilities, which in turn must provide attack vectors to delivery systems. All of this involves **operations** in **cyberspace**, and it is in this domain that great power rivals seek **vulnerabilities** to exploit in a constant struggle for advantage.

The use of cyberspace to gain an advantage over adversaries takes many forms and is not always aimed at nuclear systems. China has been accused of engaging in widespread **cyberespionage** to steal technical secrets from U.S. firms for economic and military advantages. Russia has been accused, most extensively in the Robert Mueller report, of exploiting cyberspace to **interfere** in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Nonstate actors, including terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State group, have used the internet for **recruiting** combatants and spreading fear. Criminal groups, including some thought to be allied with state actors, such as North Korea, have used cyberspace to **extort money** from banks, municipalities, and individuals.[4](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote04) Attacks such as these occupy most of the time and attention of civilian and military cybersecurity organizations that attempt to thwart such attacks. Yet for those who worry about strategic stability and the risks of nuclear escalation, it is the threat of cyberattacks on NC3 systems that provokes the greatest concern.

This concern stems from the fact that, despite the immense effort devoted to protecting NC3 systems from cyberattack, no enterprise that relies so extensively on computers and cyberspace can be made 100 percent invulnerable to attack. This is so because such systems employ many devices and operating systems of various origins and vintages, most incorporating numerous software updates and “patches” over time, offering multiple vectors for attack. Electronic components can also be modified by hostile actors during production, transit, or insertion; and the **whole system** itself is **dependent** to a **considerable degree** on the **electrical grid**, which itself is **vulnerable** to cyberattack and is far **less protected**. Experienced “**cyberwarriors**” of every major power have been working for years to probe for **weaknesses** in these systems and in many cases have devised cyberweapons, typically, malicious software (**malware**) and computer viruses, to exploit those weaknesses for military advantage.[5](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote05)

Although activity in cyberspace is much more difficult to detect and track than conventional military operations, enough information has become public to indicate that the major **nuclear powers**, notably China, Russia, and the United States, along with such secondary powers as Iran and North Korea, have established **extensive** cyberwarfare capabilities and engage in **offensive cyberoperations** on a **regular basis**, often aimed at **critical** military **infrastructure**. “Cyberspace is a contested environment where we are in constant contact with adversaries,” General Paul M. Nakasone, commander of the U.S. Cyber Command (Cybercom), told the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2019. “We see near-peer competitors [China and Russia] conducting sustained campaigns below the level of armed conflict to erode American strength and gain strategic advantage.”

Although eager to speak of adversary threats to U.S. interests, Nakasone was noticeably but not surprisingly reluctant to say much about U.S. offensive operations in cyberspace. He acknowledged, however, that Cybercom took such action to disrupt possible Russian interference in the 2018 midterm elections. “We created a persistent presence in cyberspace to monitor adversary actions and crafted tools and tactics to frustrate their efforts,” he testified in February. According to press accounts, this included a cyberattack aimed at paralyzing the Internet Research Agency, a “troll farm” in St. Petersburg said to have been deeply involved in generating disruptive propaganda during the 2016 presidential elections.[6](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote06)

Other press investigations have disclosed two other offensive operations undertaken by the United States. One called “Olympic Games” was intended to disrupt Iran’s drive to increase its uranium-enrichment capacity by sabotaging the centrifuges used in the process by infecting them with the so-called Stuxnet virus. Another left of launch effort was intended to cause malfunctions in North Korean missile tests.[7](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote07) Although not aimed at either of the U.S. principal nuclear adversaries, those two attacks demonstrated a willingness and capacity to conduct cyberattacks on the nuclear infrastructure of other states.

Efforts by **strategic rivals of** the United States to **infiltrate** and eventually **degrade** U.S. **nuclear infrastructure** are far **less documented** but thought to be **no less prevalent**. Russia, for example, is believed to have planted **malware** in the U.S. electrical utility grid, possibly with the intent of **cutting off** the **flow** of **electricity** to critical **NC3 facilities** in the event of a major crisis.[8](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote08) Indeed, every major power, including the United States, is believed to have **crafted cyberweapons** aimed at critical **NC3 components** and to have implanted malware in enemy systems for potential use in some future confrontation.

Pathways to Escalation

Knowing that the NC3 systems of the major powers are constantly being probed for weaknesses and probably infested with malware designed to be activated in a crisis, what does this say about the risks of escalation from a nonkinetic battle, that is, one fought without traditional weaponry, to a kinetic one, at first using conventional weapons and then, potentially, nuclear ones? None of this can be predicted in advance, but those analysts who have studied the subject worry about the emergence of dangerous new pathways for escalation. Indeed, several such scenarios have been identified.[9](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote09)

The first and possibly most **dangerous path** to **escalation** would arise from the **early use** of **cyberweapons** in a great power **crisis** to ~~paralyze~~ **undermine** the vital command, control, and communications capabilities of an adversary, many of which serve nuclear and conventional forces. In the “**fog of war**” that would naturally ensue from such an encounter, the recipient of such an attack might fear more punishing follow-up kinetic attacks, possibly including the use of nuclear weapons, and, **fearing** the **loss** of its own **arsenal**, **launch** its weapons **immediately**. This might occur, for example, in a confrontation between NATO and Russian forces in east and central Europe or between U.S. and Chinese forces in the Asia-Pacific region.

Speaking of a possible confrontation in Europe, for example, James N. Miller Jr. and Richard Fontaine wrote that “both sides would have **overwhelming incentives** to go **early** with **offensive** cyber and counter-space **capabilities** to **negate** the other side’s military capabilities or **advantages**.” If these early attacks succeeded, “it could result in huge **military** and **coercive advantage** for the attacker.” This might induce the recipient of such attacks to back down, affording its rival a major victory at very low cost. Alternatively, however, the recipient might view the attacks on its critical command, control, and communications infrastructure as the **prelude** to a **full-scale attack** aimed at **neutralizing** its **nuclear capabilities** and choose to strike first. “It is worth considering,” Miller and Fontaine concluded, “how even a very limited attack or incident could set both sides on a slippery slope to rapid escalation.”[10](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote10)

What makes the insertion of **latent malware** in an adversary’s NC3 systems so **dangerous** is that it may not even **need** to be **activated** to **increase** the **risk** of **nuclear escalation**. If a nuclear-armed state comes to believe that its critical systems are infested with enemy malware, its leaders might **not trust** the information provided by its early-warning systems in a crisis and might **misconstrue** the **nature** of an **enemy attack**, leading them to **overreact** and possibly **launch** their **nuclear weapons** out of **fear** they are at **risk** of a **preemptive strike**.

“The **uncertainty** caused by the unique character of a cyber threat could **jeopardize** the **credibility** of the **nuclear deterrent** and **undermine strategic stability** in ways that advances in nuclear and conventional weapons do not,” Page O. Stoutland and Samantha Pitts-Kiefer wrote in 2018 paper for the Nuclear Threat Initiative. “[T]he introduction of a **flaw** or **malicious code** into nuclear weapons through the **supply chain** that **compromises** the **effectiveness** of those **weapons** could lead to a **lack** of **confidence** in the **nuclear deterrent**,” undermining strategic stability.[11](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote11) Without confidence in the reliability of its nuclear weapons infrastructure, a nuclear-armed state may misinterpret confusing signals from its early-warning systems and, fearing the worst, launch its own nuclear weapons rather than lose them to an enemy’s first strike. This makes the scenario proffered in the 2018 NPR report, of a nuclear response to an enemy cyberattack, that much more alarming.

**1AC — Plan**

**Plan: The United States federal judiciary should substantially increase prohibitions on private sector conduct that is more restrictive of competition than reasonably necessary to enable creation of information technology standards.**

**1AC — Solvency**

**Solvency —**

**The plan requires SSO’s to administer reasonable action to prohibit ex post opportunism---that strengthens FRAND effectiveness while enabling SEP holders to capture appropriate royalties---which is the best competition-innovation balance.**

**Melamed & Shapiro 18**, \*A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf)

3. Application of the Basic Legal Principles

The antitrust principle is **straightforward**: industry-wide collaboration through SSOs to establish procompetitive standards is **permitted** only if it is **no more restrictive** of competition than **reasonably necessary** to enable creation of the standards. When standard setting predictably creates technology **monopolies** that, if unrestrained, will enable **anticompetitive** ex post **opportunism** that would otherwise not occur, an SSO that **does not** take **effective** measures to prevent or minimize such ex post opportunism engages in conduct that is **more restrictive** of competition than necessary. In that case, the SSO and, in appropriate cases, its members, may well **violate Section 1** of the **Sherman Act**.

Under this principle, SSO procedures and FRAND rules should be **evaluated** based on whether they lead to **reasonable** SEP **royalties**, using the competitive ex ante licensing standard discussed above, which has been **adopted** by the courts in patent law. Put differently, FRAND rules should be evaluated based on their ability to prevent SEP holders from obtaining **more** than the **ex ante value** of their **technology** from implementers.

This limitation **would not** prevent a SEP holder from **proﬁting**, perhaps **greatly**, from participating in the SSO and having its patented technology included in the standard. The SEP holder **continues** to be **rewarded** for its technology because the inclusion of its technology in the standard can still **greatly increase** the volume of licensing opportunities available to the SEP holder.

Whether a particular set of FRAND rules are sufficiently effective in preventing ex post opportunism will depend on the particular circumstances. The procedural unfolding of the case will also depend upon the circumstances. As a general matter, the case would probably be structured as an ordinary **Rule of Reason** case.82

First, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate **harm** to **competition** as a result of the collaboration of the SSO’s members, many of which compete with one another. In this case, the harm to competition would stem from the ability of the SEP holder to exercise **monopoly** power by obtaining royalties in **excess** of the **competitive**, ex ante level. The decision to include patented technologies in the standard would be the allegedly **unlawful** agreement. Notably, the court **need not** determine what a FRAND royalty is; it would **suffice** to **determine** that **market power** has been **created** or **exercised**, and that existing SSO rules and policies were **not adequate** to prevent the competitive harm. The defendant, which could be the SSO or perhaps one or more SSO members, would win at this point if the plaintiff failed to show harm to competition. If might fail if the standard faces substantial competition and the court concludes that the SEP holder therefore does not have market power or if the SSO’s rules and policies are found to be effective in preventing ex post opportunism, even if the plaintiff or even the court thinks that other rules and policies would be preferable.

Second, if the plaintiff makes the requisite showing of harm to competition, the **defendant(s)** would then have to show some **procompetitive justiﬁcation**— in this case, the **beneﬁts** of the standard. These two initial steps should be straightforward.

Third, if as is likely the defendant is able to show a procompetitive justiﬁcation, the plaintiff would have to show that the SSO could have used available, reasonable **alternatives** to realize the **efficiency beneﬁts** with less or **none** of the competitive **harms**. The plaintiff might identify reasonable **alternatives** that would have led to a **different** standard, based on including **unpatented** technology in the standard or perhaps involving **fewer SEPs** or **fewer owners** of SEPs, which would be **less subject** to patent holdup. More likely, the plaintiff could suggest alternative SSO rules that would not change the standard, but would **reduce** the **likelihood** or extent of ex post **opportunism**. For example, the plaintiff might suggest more rigorous FRAND-type rules, such as rules that set forth more precise principles on which FRAND royalties are to be determined and the circumstances under which SEP holders might seek injunctions.

Fourth, the burden would then shift to the defendant(s) to show that the beneﬁts of the standard **could not** have been **realized** if the SSO had adopted any of the proffered **alternatives** or that those alternatives were unrealistic.83 The plaintiff would be entitled to judgment if the court concludes that those beneﬁts could have been realized with less competitive harm if the SSO had adopted the standard with different IPR rules or policies.

Our overall sense, based on experience and the empirical literature, is that the extant FRAND rules are generally useful, but tend to be **inadequate** because they are **imprecise** and leave **unresolved** such critical issues as (a) the meaning of a **reasonable** royalty, even conceptually; (b) the meaning of “**non-discriminatory**;” (c) to whom licenses must be offered; and (d) under what circumstances may a SEP holder obtain an injunction.84 These **imprecise** FRAND commitments are therefore **not sufficient** to adequately prevent ex post opportunism. The recent revisions to IEEE’s FRAND policy represent a signiﬁcant step in the right direction, but even this advance leaves important questions **unanswered**.85 If FRAND rules are inadequate in these ways, litigation involving extant FRAND rules would likely be resolved only at the ﬁnal, fourth step. The defendant would be able to **demonstrate** the **beneﬁts** created by the standard; the plaintiff would be able to demonstrate the **creation** of **market power** and that other reasonable and practical rules or policies would **ameliorate** the problem. The case would thus turn on whether the defendant is able to demonstrate that signiﬁcant beneﬁts associated with standardization could not have been realized if the SSO had adopted those other rules or policies.

The court would have **available** a **variety** of **possible remedies** if the plaintiff prevails. Implementers that paid supracompetitive royalties or were unlawfully excluded in whole or in part from product markets as a result of the inadequate FRAND policies would be **entitled** to **damages** and, in some cases, to **treble damages**.86 If the unlawful SSO conduct is regarded as the **collective action** of the SSO and its members, which is likely to be the case in most instances, SSO members would be **jointly** and **severally liable** for the damages. Forward-looking injunctive relief aimed at restoring competition would need to be fashioned to the requirements of the individual case. For example, a court could order the SSO to adopt a new rule or policy proposed by the plaintiff. If the court is reluctant to take on that governance role, it might give the SSO a period of time—maybe ninety days—to develop a rule, subject to the court’s ultimate approval, which would adequately ameliorate the competitive problem created by the SSO. Alternatively or in addition, the court might order the parties to attempt to **negotiate** a **rule** or policy on which they can agree. And, depending on the circumstances, the court might order SEP holders, including at least those that were defendants in the case, to comply with the new SSO rules and policies.

**Threatening antitrust liability lures SSO’s into adopting best practices.**

**Lemley & Shapiro 13**, \*Mark Lemley is the William H. Neukom Professor at Stanford Law School and a partner at Durie Tangri LLP; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley and a Senior Consultant at Charles River Associates; (2013, “A SIMPLE APPROACH TO SETTING REASONABLE ROYALTIES FOR STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS”, (https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/frand.pdf)

Under our approach, many of these issues should become moot, since the patentee cannot obtain an injunction (or transfer the patent to someone who can) against a willing licensee, and since competitors are not involved in jointly setting the reasonable royalty rate. If SSOs set clear, reasonable rules following the best practices we recommend, and parties follow those rules, there should be **little** or **no need** for **antitrust** to **intervene**. Indeed, even the risk of non-disclosure of a patent is lessened, since the patentee has committed to license its essential patents whether or not it discloses them. For the most part, the rules we have described are **self-executing**, meaning that even if a party tries to break the rules set by the SSO there still may be no need for antitrust to intervene. Thus, we suggest that **parties** who **abide** by these **procedures**—patentees, implementers, and the SSOs themselves—should be **immune** from **antitrust liability** for activities that merely follow those rules.107 They have entered into an arrangement that is **on balance good** for **competition**, one that allows patentees to receive **reasonable royalties** but **prevents holdup** and **reduces** the risk of **monopolization** by **trickery**.

The fact that antitrust remains a last resort available when SSOs don’t follow best practices may have two practical benefits, however. First, under our approach the **promise** of **avoiding** the risk of **antitrust liability** will be a **powerful incentive** for both SSOs and patent owners to **adopt** the **best practices** we propose. Second, the risk of antitrust liability may be relevant when an individual patentee wants to adopt best practices but the SSO governing the standard has not yet done so. We propose that a patentee that unilaterally commits to the FRAND procedures we describe here should be immune from antitrust liability for following these procedures.108 A patentee’s unilateral binding commitment to arbitration could be enforced whether or not it was elicited by an SSO. Thus, just as the prospect of antitrust immunity might **lure SSOs** to **adopt best practices**, it might also lure **patentees** to **implement** those **practices** even if the SSO has not done so. Given the large number of standard-essential patents based on preexisting standards,109 and given that SSOs tend to update their IP rules rather slowly,110 this is **not** a **small matter**.

**Only antitrust enforcement creates a consumer-action feature that counterbalances SSO’s conspiratorial incentives---private action fails.**

**Melamed & Shapiro 18**, \*A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, <https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf>)

2. Why Antitrust Enforcement Is Necessary

Some SSO members have an interest in ensuring that the SSO takes steps to minimize the potential harms from the SEP holders’ monopoly power, and this undoubtedly explains in part why most SSOs have adopted FRAND policies or similar requirements. But, as shown in the economic model in the Appendix,73 SSOs **cannot** in general **be counted on** to adopt effective FRAND policies. The bases for this conclusion, which is central to our argument for the applicability of Section 1 to SSO FRAND rules, can be summarized as follows.74

First, the SSO members **collectively have an interest** in permitting SEP holders to charge supracompetitive royalties that elevate the downstream price of compliant devices to the monopoly level. Doing so will enable the members **in aggregate** to collect **increased revenues** from consumers, and thus to generate **increased profits** that in theory could be **shared by all** the members. In other words, supracompetitive royalties can enrich industry participants as a group at the expense of final consumers. This fact alone should serve as a **clear and strong signal** regarding the **dangers** of counting on SSOs to implement effective FRAND policies: if the SSO members negotiate **efficiently**, the outcome will be **just as bad** for consumers as if the members agreed to **fix downstream prices**.75 The **fundamental problem** is that **final consumers** are **not at the table** when the SSO rules are negotiated.

Second, SSO members that own SEPs but earn little or no profits as implementers have a **powerful self-interest** in being able to exercise the ex post monopoly power associated with their SEPs. Because SSO policies are usually determined by a **consensus** process, these members will likely be able to **block the adoption** of **fully effective FRAND policies**. Moreover, these SSO members often have the greatest interest in SSO patent policies. Since much of their income may be attributable to patent licensing, they can be expected to devote substantial resources to block the adoption of FRAND policies that effectively prevent patent holdup.

Third, even SSO members that earn **significant profits** as implementers may have **mixed incentives** if they also own SEPs, which can also lead to **weak or in-effective FRAND rules**. In the Appendix, we show that, if the **requisite share** of votes in the SSO are cast by firms whose **share of SEP royalties** is at least as large as their share of **downstream profits**, and if these firms can coordinate their voting over the FRAND rules, then an SSO **unconstrained** by antitrust laws will establish FRAND rules leading to an outcome **no better for consumers** than would result from an **integrated monopolist** controlling all SEPs and all downstream sales.76

Fourth, even SSO members that are **downstream implementers** and own few, if any, SEPs may have only a **modest interest** in promoting effective policies to restrict ex post opportunism. Because all implementers will be subject to the opportunism, all of them will face **increased licensing costs**, and therefore will likely be able to **pass on** most or all of the **increased costs** to their customers.77 Furthermore, these implementers might not be **especially active** or **effective** in the standard-setting process for **free-riding** or **public-good** reasons, especially if SEP royalties constitute only a **relatively small portion** of the costs of their standard-implementing products. Public choice theory predicts that the highly motivated SEP holders are likely to have the **greatest influence** over **patent policies**.

Empirical evidence bears out these concerns. As a starting point, we find it striking that SSO FRAND rules are almost **always quite vague**.78 Notably, SSOs in which SEP holders are more prevalent tend to have weaker FRAND rules.79 Further, to our knowledge, SSOs have made almost **no effort** to enforce their FRAND rules and have, instead, **left enforcement** efforts to **others**.80 This evidence raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of the existing FRAND rules in preventing ex post opportunism.

#### Antitrust is critical---the broad standing and available remedies afforded are vastly superior to any other types of law.

Cary et al. 11, \*Messrs. George Cary and Alex Sistla are members of the California and District of Columbia Bars. Mr. Mark Nelson is a member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars. Mr. Steven Kaiser is a member of the New Jersey and District of Columbia Bars; (2011, “THE CASE FOR ANTITRUST LAW TO POLICE THE PATENT HOLDUP PROBLEM INSTANDARD SETTING”, <https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/organize-archive/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/the-case-for-antitrust-law-to-police-the-patent-holdup-problem-in-the-standard-setting.pdf>)

III. CONCLUSION

Patent holdup where a patentee has deceived an SSO in order to secure a position in the standard is, at its core, an antitrust problem. In this context, patent holders harm consumers by exploiting the competition-reducing aspects of standard setting to their own private advantage. In addition to being the body of law directed toward anticompetitive conduct, antitrust provides numerous practical advantages, including the possibility of governmental enforcement, and appropriately broad standing.

Remedying the patent holdup problem exclusively through non-antitrust legal remedies would be perverse. Indeed, it would be a bit like remedying patent infringement through the doctrine of common law conversion. In some instances, it might work, but there certainly would be under-enforcement.

To be sure, there are instances where deceptive conduct by the patentee does not harm competition and, in those instances, there is no antitrust claim. Often there will be patent remedies in that situation, or contract or even tort remedies. The legal regimes can and do coexist peacefully.

Those who argue that the marginal benefit of antitrust remedies do not out-weigh the cost of antitrust litigation both understate the benefits (broad standing and ready remedies where appropriate) and overstate the costs (the potential, however unknown, of “false positives,” i.e., condemning behavior that is not anticompetitive). In addition to being overstated, the false positives concern is also misplaced in this context. Unlike an antitrust attack on price cutting or a securities offering, the risk of a false positive here is not the over-deterrence of desired behavior, but rather that over-deterrence of deceptive and opportunistic behavior. Fretting about that form of over-deterrence seems itself to be a misallocation of resources. And preventing that form of over-deterrence by reliance on the competitive outcomes under legal regimes not designed to protect competition strikes us as unwise.

#### \*Ex ante disclosure solves lock-in, improves transparency and openness.

Contreras 13, \*Jorge L. Contreras is a Presidential Scholar and Professor of Law at the University of Utah with an adjunct appointment in the Department of Human Genetics. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School (JD) and Rice University (BSEE, BA); (Contreras, J. L. (2013). TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND EX ANTE DISCLOSURE: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF AN EMPIRICAL STUDY. Jurimetrics, 53(2), 163-211. Retrieved from https://www2.lib.ku.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/technical-standards-ex-ante-disclosure-results/docview/1428261870/se-2?accountid=14556)

Ex ante disclosure of licensing terms could potentially alleviate the causes of such disputes by making a patent holder's royalty rate known before lock-in of a standard. Thus, if maximum royalty rates were known in advance, it would be more difficult for an implementer to argue that such rates were unreasonable (as the SDO could have chosen an alternative technology if this were the case).148 Lacking this potential defense against an infringement claim by the patent holder, implementers might be more inclined to negotiate with patent holders before the adoption of a standard. By the same token, if a patent holder knew that its maximum royalty rate would be scrutinized before the approval of a standard, and that SDO participants would be free to consider alternative, less costly technologies, it would have an incentive to disclose a royalty rate that was as reasonable (or low) as possible.149

Ex ante disclosure of licensing terms has an intuitive appeal. Like the prices of menu items at a restaurant, it has been argued that the royalty rates for standards-essential patents should be disclosed before product vendors (diners) are locked into costly technology choices. But critics of ex ante disclosure have argued that requiring early disclosure of licensing terms will impede standards-development processes and create additional legal risks for participants. To assess the validity of these complaints, we studied ex ante licensing disclosures at VITA, IEEE and IETF and found no evidence that such policies resulted in measurable negative effects on the number of standards started or adopted, personal time commitments or quality of standards, nor was there compelling evidence that ex ante policies caused the lengthening of time required for standardization or the depression of royalty rates. There was evidence to suggest that the adoption of ex ante policies may have contributed to positive effects observed on some of these variables. In addition, a significant majority of participants in VITA, the only SDO adopting a mandatory ex ante policy, felt that the information elicited by the organization's ex ante policy improved the overall openness and transparency of the standards-development process. Thus, while there are numerous areas in which further study and analysis may be warranted, and other organizations in which the implementation of ex ante policies may have different effects, we concluded that the process-based criticisms of ex ante policies and the predicted negative effects flowing from the adoption of such policies are not supported by the available evidence.

# 2AC

## Adv — Innovation

#### Courts are experienced and competent at calculating fair royalties.

Cary et al. 08, \*George Cary is a partner in the Washington office of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. He is a former Deputy Director of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Competition and 1976 graduate of the Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California-Berkeley. \*Larry Work-Dembowski is an associate in the Washington office of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP and a 2002 graduate of the Georgetown University Law Center. \*Paul Hayes is an associate in the Washington office of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP and a 2001 graduate of the New York University School of Law; (“Antitrust Implications of Abuse of Standard-Setting”, 15 GEO. Mason L. REV. 1241 (2008))

Although evaluation of FRAND commitments and licensing terms can be complex and fact-intensive, there should be no doubt that the courts and enforcement agencies are competent to apply antitrust law to deceptive FRAND commitments. Assessing whether a licensor has complied with its FRAND obligations does not require courts or agencies to make any determinations that they do not already commonly make in antitrust and intellectual property cases. Courts routinely calculate "reasonable royalties" in the patent litigation context 1 ' and compare the "but for" competitive market to the market in which a restraint of competition exists in order to determine damages in the antitrust context. 4 ' In assessing whether a licensor has met its FRAND obligations, a court would engage in similar calculations; it would compare the royalties charged in the ex post market to its assessment of what royalties would have prevailed in the competitive ex ante market.'43 In determining what royalties would have prevailed ex ante, a court would likely consider, among other things, the available alternatives to the technology at issue, the royalties charged to licensees practicing other standards for comparable technologies, and the royalties charged to licensees for comparable technologies in industries where there are no standards or FRAND commitments. Although this may be a demanding task in some cases, it is necessary because the alternative-concluding that FRAND obligations cannot be defined or enforced by the courts-would render FRAND obligations meaningless, would allow unfettered exercise of monopoly power by essential patent holders, and would cause debilitating un- certainty in the standard-setting process.

#### They’d be liable for patent infringement.

Hovenkamp 21, \*Herbert Hovenkamp, James G. Dinan University Professor, Penn Law and the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and in 2008 won the Justice Department’s John Sherman Award for lifetime contributions to antitrust law. (September 8th, 2021, “The DOJ’s “New Madison” Doctrine Disregards Both the Economics and the Law of Innovation”, https://promarket.org/2021/09/08/doj-madison-doctrine-antitrust-innovation/)

The New Madison doctrine clearly cannot be justified as incentivizing innovation in new technologies. Quite the contrary. It is justifiable only if compelled by the Constitution or the relevant statutes. On the innovation point, the doctrine imagines a process in which standard setting organizations “hold out,” compelling patentees to commit their patents to universal licensing requirements if they want to have them adopted. Faced with this threat the patentees have no choice but to commit to licensing their patents at oppressively low royalties.

But patent law does not work that way, and the holdout problem is completely imagined. To the contrary, patentees egregiously over declare their patents as standard essential, and for a good reason: once patents are declared they become more valuable. By default, they will be included in the licensing package governing that technology. For this reason, holders of standard essential patents must accept independent royalty determinations, usually by either arbitration or a federal court, that assess the value of the patent prior to its incorporation into a standard. This procedure applies a simple law and economics principle that the New Madison doctrine ignores: when multiple inventors are competing for a standard, one way to ensure competitive outcomes is to make them [bid up front to be the provider](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/466643). As for the holdout threat, if a group of manufacturers employ a technology without paying, they will be guilty of patent infringement and their damages will be based on the patent’s current value.

#### 1---there’s no impact to winning this argument.

Cotter et al. 19, \*Thomas F. Cotter, Briggs and Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School; Innovators Network Foundation Intellectual Property Fellow; \*Erik Hovenkamp, Assistant Professor, USC Gould School of Law; \*Norman Siebrasse, Professor of Law, University of New Brunswick Faculty of Law; (2019, “Demystifying Patent Holdup”, https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4667&context=wlulr)

B. Patent Holdup Is Not a Problem, Because It Is Not Systemic

A second, related argument is that there is no empirical evidence of patent owners engaging in pervasive, systemic patent holdup in the very industries holdup theorists are most concerned with (e.g., telecommunications).139 Indeed, according to the critics, if holdup were pervasive one would expect innovation and growth in the affected industries to “stagnate, wither, or die,”140 whereas if one looks “across human history, it is not clear that the commercialization of complex technologies has ever been faster than it is today in those industries that reform proponents point to as most plagued by the patent holdup ‘problem.’”141

Although we agree that whether, or to what extent, patent holdup occurs in the real world is ultimately an empirical matter, the implication that patent holdup is a problem only if it is “pervasive” or “systemic” is a non sequitur.142 If our analysis above is correct—that the ability to engage in patent holdup depends on path dependence, that settings conducive to patent holdup are not uncommon, and that the three components of a holdup royalty can exist independently of one another—patent holdup does not have to be systemic to be capable of reducing social welfare. Seeing how the empirical critiques of patent holdup do “not claim[ ] that individual firms never attempt to engage in behavior that can be characterized as holdup,”143 the conclusion that holdup is not systemic may well be accurate, for all we know, while still being of any limited relevance for purposes of determining whether injunctive relief should issue on the facts of any one particular case.144 If the choice were between always granting an injunction without tailoring or conditions, and never granting any form of injunctive relief, perhaps the question of whether holdup was systemic, at least in a particular industry, would be central. But the traditional approach to injunctive relief looks to the facts of the particular case.145

#### Patent holdup is real and necessitates intervention, even if it can’t be systemically proven.

Contreras 19, \*Jorge Contreras, Professor, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law; (2019, “MUCH ADO ABOUT HOLD-UP”, <https://www.illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Contreras.pdf>)

B. Protective Measures May Already Be Working to Reduce Hold-Up

Another important factor that should be considered regarding the purported lack of empirical evidence of systemic hold-up is the effect that existing policy measures have already had in reducing hold-up. As noted above, the threat of patent hold-up was a primary motivating factor for many SDOs to adopt policies requiring the disclosure and licensing of SEPs. These policies have been in place for decades. In the United States, the first such policy was adopted in 1959 by the American Standards Association (the predecessor to today’s American National Standards Institute (ANSI).102 Today, every one of the more than 200 ANSI-accredited developers of American National Standards must adhere to ANSI’s essential requirements, including the adoption of such a licensing policy for SEPs. Similar policies have existed in European and international standards organizations since at least the 1980s.103 These policies, which were developed by SDOs in large part to reduce the likelihood of hold-up within standard-setting systems, have had several decades to work, and it is likely that the lack of observed hold-up in some studies can be attributed to the successful operation of these policies.

Similarly, antitrust and competition enforcement agencies in the U.S. and Europe have been aware of the potential for hold-up connected with standardization for many years. Accordingly, they have brought enforcement actions when it has been alleged that hold-up behavior has resulted in a violation of the antitrust laws. High-profile enforcement actions against patent holders such as Rambus, 104 Google 105 and Qualcomm106 send powerful deterrent signals to the market and warn others not to engage in similar behavior lest they, too, become the subject of agency enforcement. Like SDO policies, it is likely that the general market awareness of agency interest in standard-setting and hold-up has, to a degree, limited the amount of hold-up that is actually attempted in the marketplace, thereby limiting the direct evidence of hold-up as a systemic problem.

But do the deterrent effects of SDO and agency efforts to reduce hold-up signify that hold-up is not a problem? Certainly not. To reach such a conclusion would be perverse: akin to claiming that burglary is not a problem in a neighborhood that experiences reduced burglary rates after it has implemented an active neighborhood watch program and enhanced policing.

C. Indicia of Healthy Markets do not Prove the Absence of Anticompetitive Conduct

As noted above, one of the principal arguments advanced by commentators seeking to refute the “hold-up theory” is that markets for telecommunications products, namely smart phones, are robust – evidenced by increasing product functionality, decreasing consumer prices and rapid innovation -- and that this degree of robustness indicates that hold-up cannot be a problem in these markets.107 If hold-up were a problem in these markets, they reason, we would see product stagnation, stable (but high) prices, and a lack of competition – features associated with classic examples of hold-up in markets for products such as natural resources and agricultural goods.108

But this argument relies on a false syllogism: hold-up results in market dysfunction; if a market functions well, then it cannot be subject to hold-up. The weaknesses in this argument are multifold. First, hold-up may exist in individual instances without sufficient weight to affect overall market characteristics, particularly in a large global market such as mobile telecommunications. Thus hold-up may exist, even in a market that outwardly appears to be functioning well. Second, there is no valid counterfactual to use to compare the health and robustness of the market for mobile telecommunications products.109 Other consumer electronics devices, such as televisions and DVD players, do not compare well with mobile telecommunications devices, which have taken on a unique character in the modern networked economy. Thus, observing the strength of the market fails to answer the critical questions “compared to what?” and how much stronger the market might be (through more product diversity, functionality, price reduction) without hold-up?

A simple historical illustration is useful in this context. During the decade leading up to the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, several major U.S. commodity markets (e.g., steel, salt, petroleum, coal, sugar, lead, and others) came under intense scrutiny for a variety of allegedly anticompetitive industrial arrangements. One might have argued that these markets, had they been subject to the sorts of anticompetitive collusion that the Sherman Act sought to address, should have seen reductions of output and increases in price. Yet, between 1880 and 1890, U.S. output of salt, petroleum, steel, and coal all increased significantly, and prices of steel, sugar and lead all dropped significantly.110 Do these positive market indicia demonstrate that the subject markets were not subject to anticompetitive collusion, and that the Sherman Act was not necessary? Certainly, investigations of these industries revealed significant cartel behavior. I would suggest that few commentators today would argue that the coal, steel, sugar and other major industrial producers of the late nineteenth century were innocent of collusive and anticompetitive conduct, or that the Sherman Act was not a necessary and beneficial measure for the U.S. economy.111 Yet, had we relied solely on the positive characteristics exhibited by these markets as proof that anticompetitive conduct did not exist, then perhaps the Sherman Act never would have been enacted.

By the same token, the fact that global markets for standardized products such as computers and smart phones appear to be thriving does not itself refute the possibility of hold-up nor the existence of anticompetitive conduct in these markets. Nor does it allow regulators and policy makers to drop their guard or cease to monitor these important industries.

#### Don’t trust authors from GMU’s Mercatus Institute (or Global Antitrust Institute).

McLaughlin 21, Bloomberg, (David, March 12th, 2021, “One Tech-Funded University Helped Shape FTC’s Hands-Off Approach”, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-12/how-george-mason-university-shaped-ftc-s-hands-off-approach-to-tech>)

* Alden Abbott, Jonathan Barnett are both fellows at George Mason University’s Center for Intellectual Property and Innovation Policy (funded by Qualcomm)
* Joshua Wright is a former FTC commissioner who taught at the institute and lobbied for Qualcomm

The [Tech Transparency Project](https://www.techtransparencyproject.org/) (TTP), a watchdog group in Washington, details in a new report an unusually close relationship between the law school at Virginia’s George Mason University and the Federal Trade Commission. By helping shape the workforce of the FTC, the group claims, the school infused it with a laissez-faire philosophy favorable to the school’s tech donors.

[The report](https://www.techtransparencyproject.org/articles/big-techs-backdoor-ftc) throws a harsh light on the FTC’s hands-off approach to tech companies over the past decade. As the agency prepares to argue the lawsuit against [Facebook Inc.](https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/FB:US) that it filed late last year, seeking to break up the social media giant, it must contend with an inconvenient fact: It approved Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014—the very mergers it now seeks to undo. The FTC’s consent to those deals is cited by critics as evidence of a permissive attitude that allowed tech companies to grow into leviathans.

One explanation for its lenience, the TTP report charges, is that the industry used a corner of academia to capture the agency. According to the report, which was published on March 12, Silicon Valley donated substantial sums to George Mason’s Antonin Scalia Law School, which built a pipeline of professors and graduates who went to work at the FTC. Dozens of people went from the school to the regulator—commissioners, bureau heads, attorney-advisers, legal interns—during the Obama and Trump administrations.

Under President Trump alone, professors and graduates of Scalia Law, and heads of affiliated programs at George Mason, served as the FTC chair, general counsel, policy planning head, and leaders of its three main divisions: the bureaus of competition, consumer protection, and economics.

Katie Paul, who heads the TTP, says an investigation is needed into “whether George Mason University has effectively become Big Tech’s back door into the FTC, giving the companies an undisclosed way to sway its decision-making and hobble enforcement action.”

Revolving Door

Large tech companies have donated to two programs affiliated with Scalia Law, the Global Antitrust Institute and the Law & Economics Center. From January 2018 to the end of last year, [Google](https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/GOOGL:US) donated $900,000, [Amazon.com Inc.](https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/AMZN:US) contributed $925,000, and Facebook Inc. gave $675,000, according to documents obtained by Bloomberg Businessweek through a public records request. Google, Amazon, and Facebook declined to comment on their donations.

The law school says the ties between its faculty and the FTC aren’t unusual. Alison Price, a senior associate dean, says it’s common for professors to work for federal agencies and then return to their teaching jobs. “Since Scalia Law has special expertise and a relatively large faculty in antitrust, it’s logical that our faculty is called to serve with frequency,” she says. “But faculty don’t set policy; administrations do.”

The Tech Transparency Project is part of a larger watchdog group, [Campaign for Accountability](https://campaignforaccountability.org/). The TTP website cites several philanthropists as donors, including George Soros’s Open Society Foundations. Oracle Corp. had been a donor to a TTP predecessor group that focused mostly on Google, but the TTP says it no longer accepts corporate funding.

Both George Mason programs, which host conferences and offer training for judges and antitrust enforcers, promote the consumer-welfare standard articulated by Robert Bork, the late federal judge and Yale Law School professor. That standard, the guidepost for regulators and courts since the 1980s, looks to price increases as a gauge of competitive harm. It is blamed by some antitrust experts for handcuffing enforcers when it comes to policing tech companies.

The tech companies’ donations are drawing scrutiny. At a hearing on Feb. 25, New York Democratic Representative Mondaire Jones called Abbott “Tad” Lipsky, a former FTC official now at the [Global Antitrust Institute](https://gai.gmu.edu/), “a wolf in sheep’s clothing.” As he testified against proposals to give the antitrust laws more teeth, Lipsky drew Jones’s scorn. Programs such as the GAI “have worked to teach judges and regulators to let their guard down as corporate funders like yours came to dominate our economy,” Jones said. Lipsky responded that his antitrust views predated “any of these digital technology companies.”

A key figure in the law school-to-regulator pipeline is Lipsky’s boss, Joshua Wright, an FTC commissioner from 2013 to 2015. He now teaches antitrust law at George Mason while also running the GAI.

Wright wielded outsize influence at the agency, pushing through a 2015 policy statement in an attempt to rein in the agency’s enforcement power. After he left he improperly lobbied the agency on behalf of Qualcomm Inc., one of the law school’s largest donors, according to a report by the FTC inspector general that was obtained by TTP and verified by Bloomberg Businessweek. His name was redacted in the report, but Wright confirmed it was about him. He says he did nothing wrong.

The New York Times last year [reported that tech companies bankrolled the work of the GAI](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/technology/global-antitrust-institute-google-amazon-qualcomm.html) and that Wright had worked with corporate donors to fend off critics. The extent of the revolving door between the FTC and the law school, and Wright’s alleged violation of ethics laws, haven’t been previously reported.

Many companies support higher education, and many universities send professors and graduates to Washington. But George Mason is unique in cultivating a specific regulator, says Jeff Hauser, executive director of the [Revolving Door Project](https://therevolvingdoorproject.org/), which tracks government officials’ corporate ties.

“In terms of feeding directly into a government agency, I’m not aware of any equivalent at the SEC or the EPA or anything else,” he says, referring to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency.

A public university in the northern Virginia suburbs of Washington, George Mason is home to the free-market think tank the [Mercatus Center](https://www.mercatus.org/). It is a leader in the study of applying economic analysis to the law, emphasizing that markets work best when government regulates less. The university became known as a haven for conservatives at the end of the Reagan administration in 1988. Even Bork taught there after stepping down from the bench in 1988.

The George Mason conduit was steady and robust, according to the TTP, which details dozens of examples of people moving between the FTC and the law school over the past decade. One is James Cooper, who directs an economics and privacy program at the Law & Economics Center. He simultaneously taught at the school and served as a deputy director for the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection.

Cooper was among the academics who urged House lawmakers last year to reject proposals to break up tech companies and make merger approvals more difficult. George Mason’s Wright, Lipsky, and John Yun, a professor at the law school who was an economist at the FTC, joined the filing. Cooper didn’t respond to a request for comment, and Yun declined to comment.

But Wright, the former FTC commissioner, perhaps best embodies the ties linking the FTC to the law school and its donors. After leaving the agency in 2015, Wright simultaneously taught at George Mason, ran the GAI, and worked for the Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati law firm, where he represented Qualcomm.

The FTC sued Qualcomm in January 2017 in a monopoly case that was developed while Wright was an FTC commissioner. Wright tried to broker a settlement about four months after the case was brought. He met Lipsky, then the acting director of the FTC’s competition bureau, for lunch at a steakhouse in Washington and tried to set up an additional meeting with agency officials, according to the inspector general’s report.

In doing so, Wright violated an ethics law that bans officials for life from lobbying on issues they worked on “personally and substantially,” according to the inspector general. Those findings were referred to the Department of Justice’s public integrity section. The Justice Department, which decided not to prosecute, declined to comment.

Lipsky resigned two months after his lunch with Wright, who then hired him at the GAI. Lipsky didn’t respond to a request for comment.

“I never made any appearance at the FTC involving its enforcement action against Qualcomm or discussed the merits of the case with any FTC official,” says Wright, who declined to elaborate on the specifics of the investigation. “I immediately complied when the FTC ethics office informed me that I should not make any appearance based upon a single preliminary vote I had cast years before the case was filed.”

Qualcomm contributed almost $5.8 million to the George Mason law school programs from 2016 through 2020. Less than two months before Wright met with the FTC to try to settle the Qualcomm case, the company gave $525,000 to the GAI. The company didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Tech companies that donate to George Mason collaborate with the school’s professors on projects, according to emails obtained through a public records request.

## Adv — Cyber

## T — Per Se

#### We meet---the plan still increases prohibitions on anticompetitive conduct, the rule of reason is simply a test that decides whether certain conduct actually violates said prohibition.

Fishman 19, \*Todd Fishman, [Allen & Overy LLP](https://www.jdsupra.com/profile/Allen_Overy_docs/); (January 31st, 2019, “The Rule of Reason as a Bar to Criminal Antitrust Enforcement”, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-rule-of-reason-as-a-bar-to-criminal-87406/)

Antitrust law’s rule of reason was born of technical necessity. By its terms, §1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e] very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.” 15 U.S.C. §1. Despite the expansive language of the statutory prohibition, the Supreme Court has held that §1 prohibits only agreements that unreasonably restrain trade. *Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States*, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); *Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States*, 221 U.S. 1, 58-60 (1911). With the rule of reason, antitrust courts assumed a prudential role in administering the scope of antitrust violations, applying a factual inquiry weighing legitimate justifications for a restraint against any anticompetitive effects. Under the rule of reason, “the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.” *Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania,* 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).

#### Counter-interpretation---rule of reason is a prohibition.

Light 19, Sarah E. Light Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania., The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 137, 2019, Lexis/Nexis

While antitrust law can serve as an environmental mandate by prohibiting collusive behavior that keeps environmentally preferable goods from the market, there is also conflict between antitrust law's goals of promoting competition and environmental law's goals of promoting [\*177] conservation. 192 Because antitrust law's per se rule and rule of reason operate on a somewhat fluid continuum, 193 this Subpart discusses the two doctrines together. The per se rule operates as a prohibition, whereas the rule of reason operates as both a prohibition and a disincentive. As noted above, antitrust law generally prohibits certain types of market activity - price fixing, horizontal boycotts, and output limitations - as illegal per se, and harm to competition is presumed. 194 For example, if an industry association declines to award a seal of approval necessary for a product's sale without any good faith attempt to test the product's performance, but rather simply because that product is manufactured by a competitor, such an action would be illegal per se. 195 Under this Article's framework, a per se violation is thus a prohibition. The more fact-intensive inquiry under the rule of reason tests "whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." 196 While this extremely broad statement might suggest that any fact is relevant to the inquiry, the salient facts under the rule of reason are "those that tend to establish whether a restraint increases or decreases output, or decreases or increases prices." 197 If an anticompetitive effect is found, then the action is illegal and the rule of reason operates, like the per se rule, as a prohibition. 198 The rule of reason can also operate as a disincentive, even if no [\*178] court finds an anticompetitive effect, as uncertainty and litigation risk may discourage firms from undertaking legally permissible, environmentally positive industry collaborations. 199 Associations of firms have adopted numerous mechanisms of private environmental governance to address the management of common pool resources like fisheries, forests, and the global climate. 200 Examples include the Sustainable Apparel Coalition's Higg Index 201 and the American Chemistry Council's Responsible Care program. 202 But private industry standards raise special antitrust concerns. An agreement among competitors with respect to product or process specifications may exclude competitors who fail to meet such standards, raising the specter that such industry collaborations really constitute output limitations or efforts to limit competition. 203 While the U.S. Supreme Court has scrutinized private standard-setting associations carefully, 204 it has noted that if associations "promulgate … standards based on the merits of objective expert judgments and through procedures that prevent the standard-setting process from being biased by members with economic interests in stifling product competition … , those private standards can have significant procompetitive advantages." 205 In the absence of price fixing or a boycott, a rule of reason analysis generally applies to product standard setting by private associations. 206 The uncertain outcome [\*179] inherent in the application of antitrust law in this context could therefore serve as a potential disincentive to the adoption of private industry standards. 207 The challenge of course is that some form of explicit sanctions on noncompliant industry members may be necessary for private industry standards to be effective. In the context of private reputational mechanisms like the New York Diamond Dealers Club, 208 Barak Richman has pointed out that the Club's use of reputational sanctions and voluntary refusals to deal with actors who flout industry norms, while welfare enhancing, could nonetheless amount to violations of antitrust law. 209 This echoes the concern raised by Andrew King and Michael Lenox in their extensive empirical analysis of the Responsible Care program created by the Chemical Manufacturers Association (now the American Chemistry Council). 210 King and Lenox concluded that the absence of explicit sanctions on members who failed to meet the standards set by the program left the program vulnerable to "opportunism." 211 While they suggested that industry associations could look to third parties to enforce the rules, 212 an alternative way to facilitate the long-term environmental benefits of stronger sanctions would be to interpret antitrust law in conformity with the environmental priority principle presented below. 213 [\*180] In some instances, the conflict between the values of promoting competition and conserving environmental resources can be stark. 214 Jonathan Adler, for example, has identified this conflict in the context of fisheries - a tragedy of the commons situation in which some form of collective action is required to avoid overfishing. 215 He cites as an example Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Industries, Inc., in which a fisherman was excluded from a local fishing cooperative. 216 The fisherman sued the cooperative under the Sherman Act, and the court found an antitrust violation in his exclusion. 217 While the fishing cooperative's policies were no doubt exclusionary, Adler contends that they also promoted conservation by restricting catch. 218 The fishery collapsed by the 1950s, a collapse Adler hypothesizes might have been "inevitable" but that perhaps might not have occurred in the absence of the antitrust suit. 219 While a court performing a rule of reason analysis must consider whether a restraint on trade suppresses or destroys competition, Adler points out that courts may also "consider offsetting efficiencies from otherwise anticompetitive arrangements." 220 It is not clear, however, that the courts have consistently taken these factors into account. 221 Among other potential remedies, Adler argues that to resolve this tension between antitrust law, on the one hand, and private collective action to conserve environmental resources, on the other, courts should more actively consider the "ancillary conservation benefits of otherwise anticompetitive conduct." 222 Recognizing the long-term health of a fishery would be consistent with antitrust law's purpose of ensuring viable markets exist in the future, and consistent with the environmental priority principle introduced below. 223

#### Prohibit can mean ‘severely hinder’---doesn’t necessitate a ban.

Washington Court of Appeals 19 (KORSMO-judge. Opinion in State v. Kimball, No. 35441-5-III (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2019). Google scholar caselaw. Date accessed 7/13/21).

His argument runs counter to the meaning of the word "prohibit." It means "1. To forbid by law. 2. To prevent, preclude, or severely hinder." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1405 (10th ed. 2014). As "severely hinder" suggests, a "prohibition" need not be an all or nothing proposition.

## CP — “No Antitrust”

#### Patentees would simply sue for infringement.

Hovenkamp 20, \*Herbert J. Hovenkamp is James G. Dinan University Professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania; (2020, “FRAND and Antitrust”, <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3095&context=faculty_scholarship>)

In any event, patent infringement actions remain available in the event of infringement. Under the holdout theory, implementers supposedly band together and force a patentee (through the process of SEP choice) to agree to sub-market royalties in exchange for selection of its patents. The patentee, having no alternative, agrees. But a patentee who chooses not to participate has a damage action for patent infringement against implementers who use its invention without a li-cense.245 Further, this would likely be an action for willful infringement, leading to the possibility of multiple damages.246 To be sure, in winner take all patent races losers may go un- compensated, but that occurs only if implementers do not in-fringe their patents.247

#### SSO interests do not align with consumers. Patent law is an insufficient proxy for securing competition.

Speegle 12, \*Adam Speegle, J.D., (May 2012, “Antitrust Rulemaking as a Solution to Abuse on the Standard-Setting Process Setting Process”, https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1128&context=mlr)

Even assuming that SSO members are willing and able to engage in litigation with a firm attempting patent holdup, consumer welfare takes a backseat to the members' financial considerations.3 8 Because the incentives of the SSO members do not align with those of consumers, enforcement actions by firms in the private sector cannot be relied on to adequately protect consumers. 39 This concept is illustrated by a practice known as injunction threats, in which a patent holder threatens to bring an injunction against a manufacturer for violating its patent unless the manufacturer pays a substantial royalty.4 ° While the patent holder's threat may have questionable legal footing, the manufacturer will often pay the royalty instead of engaging in extended litigation.4 This happens for several reasons. First, the manufacturer has a disincentive to engage a patent holder in litigation because the manufacturer will bear the cost of the litigation, the result of which could benefit competitors. 42 Companies will tend to pay the royalty and wait for another company to challenge the practice. 43 Second, the costs associated with challenging injunction threats may be substantial." On top of ordinary litigation costs, if the manufacturer has already begun making and distributing goods based on the patented technology, a potential preliminary injunction could have a devastating effect on its business.4 5 While engaging a patent holder in litigation may collaterally benefit consumers in that increased royalties are not passed through to the price of the ultimate product, this benefit does not tip the scales in favor of manufacturers pursuing such a path.' Thus, reliance on litigation by SSO members or other third parties will not provide a complete solution to patent holdup, as these parties serve as poor proxies for consumers.

## CP — Regulations

#### 1---patent law can’t “regulate”. The federal role in mitigating patent holdup is non-existent aside from antitrust, and no regulatory body exists for patent law.

Cary et al. 11, \*Messrs. George Cary and Alex Sistla are members of the California and District of Columbia Bars. Mr. Mark Nelson is a member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars. Mr. Steven Kaiser is a member of the New Jersey and District of Columbia Bars; (2011, “THE CASE FOR ANTITRUST LAW TO POLICE THE PATENT HOLDUP PROBLEM INSTANDARD SETTING”, <https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/organize-archive/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/the-case-for-antitrust-law-to-police-the-patent-holdup-problem-in-the-standard-setting.pdf>)

B. IMPLIED PREEMPTION DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO PATENT HOLDUP

Even accepting the idea of implied preemption in the face of substantial regulatory regimes, the case for preempting the antitrust laws in the SSO-patent holdup context has not been made. Put simply, there is no regulatory oversight in the case of SSO-patent holdup. Although the Patent and Trade-mark Office (PTO) regulates patents in the sense of deciding what patents to issue, there is no connection between that role and the patent holdup issue. Indeed, almost every dispute involving a patent—whether patent abuse, infringement, or licensing quarrels—is ordinarily resolved through some form of private litigation or dispute resolution.79

It is of course true that there is a specialized patent court (the Federal Circuit), and that certain doctrines (laches, equitable estoppel, and misuse) have been developed to address “opportunistic behavior” by patentees. But this simply means that there is an independent body of patent law that certain private parties may enforce. The government does not actively police the behavior of patent holders in the way the SEC enforces the securities laws or the states enforce their laws in the state-action context.80 Although the PTO imposes certain duties upon patent applicants,81 it lacks the authority to impose any such similar duties upon patentees participating in a standard-setting process. SSOs impose their own disclosure obligations without any interference or oversight by the PTO. In sum, we think it is a stretch to argue that a competing regulatory scheme governs all of patent law. Many patent law defenses, such as those recognized under 35 U.S.C. § 282, are borrowed from the common law.

#### B---targeting deficit---faulting the entire SSO is key to curtail monopolization---targeting individual SEP holders fails.

Melamed & Shapiro 18, \*A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf)

Antitrust enforcement aimed only at SEP holders is not sufficient to prevent or remedy ex post opportunism. First, as described in Part I, that kind of enforcement must be implemented separately for each patent holder, and for many standards, there are hundreds or even thousands of SEP holders. Second, some of the most common kinds of opportunism are arguably beyond the reach of antitrust claims against SEP holders. 61 Moreover, enforcement aimed at SEP holders is not directed at the basic problem: the failure of the SSOs to take adequate steps to prevent the ex post opportunism that the SSOs’ conduct enabled.

## CP — ITC

#### AND their evidence concedes that companies could control and hold up the 337 investigations — we read yellow

1NC Long 16 (David W, “Litigating Standard Essential Patents at the U.S. International Trade Commission”, 17 Sedona Conf. J. 671) DB

In June 2011, Samsung filed a Complaint in the ITC alleging that some models of Apple’s iPhones and iPads infringed five Samsung patents, including two patents (U.S. Patent Nos. 7,706,348 and 7,486,644) alleged to be essential to the Universal Mobile Telecommunications Standard (UMTS) 3G cellular standard set by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) standard setting organization. Apple asserted that it did not infringe those patents and, in any event, Samsung’s commitment to ETSI that it would license those patents on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND) precluded the ITC from entering an exclusion order on them. Administrative Law Judge E. James Gildea held a hearing in June 2012 and issued his Initial Determination that rejected Apple’s FRAND defense, but found that the alleged standard essential patents were not infringed.26 Judge Gildea stated that Section 337 investigations were different from district court litigations because they involve not only potential injunctive relief, but also other personal relief such as monetary damages.27 Rather, Section 337 investigations go beyond the litigants’ private interests and extend to “time sensitive” issues of the public interest and “irremediable effects that unfair competition, including entry of patent infringing articles, might have on domestic industries.”28 He stated that the ETSI intellectual property rights (IPR) policy at issue itself states that “the national courts of law have the sole authority to resolve IPR disputes.”29 The ETSI IPR policy further counsels its members to resolve their disputes through bilateral negotiations and, if that fails, they are “invited to inform the ETSI GA in case a friendly mediation can be offered by other ETSI Members and/or the ETSI Secretariat.”30 This ETSI idea for seeking “harmony between and among the consensus-building ETSI membership” may not be readily met in patent disputes and can lead to a “delayed and protracted dispute resolution.”31 But Section 337 investigations have a wider and immediate public concern that transcends ETSI’s objectives.32 He expressed concern that “an infringing party could, by making unrealistic counter-offers to the patent holder, while claiming that such counter-offers more accurately reflect FRAND than the offers proposed by the patent holder, hold up or frustrate Section 337 investigations.”33 This could allow an “uncooperative party” to “do an end-around of a Section 337 investigation in cases of standard essential patents.”34 On the merits, Judge Gildea ruled that “the evidence does not support Apple’s allegation that Samsung failed to offer Apple licenses to Samsung’s declared-essential patents on FRAND terms.”35 Apple did not show that it availed itself of the mediation procedure suggested by the ETSI IPR policy.36 Further, Apple’s complaint that Samsung unreasonably offered a royalty at 2.4 percent of the selling price of Apple’s products was not supported by sufficient “evidence of customers and practices of industry participants showing that Samsung’s demand is invidious with respect to Apple.”37 Further, “Apple’s evidence does not demonstrate that Apple put forth a sincere, bona fide effort to bargain with Samsung.”38 Rather, both parties decided to negotiate “through the tortuous, and expensive, process of litigation.”39 Apple had not provided sufficient evidence to establish that Samsung violated its FRAND obligation.

## DA — DOJ Tradeoff

#### Turn---the DOJ is already prepared to engage in more antitrust litigation over SEP’s---tradeoffs inevitable.

Love 21, \*Bruce Love, writer at the National Law Journal; (June 15th, 2021, “As DOJ Confirms a Change in Antitrust Patent   
Policy, Lawyers Prepare for Shifting Demand”, https://www.mckoolsmith.com/assets/htmldocuments/2021%2006%2016%20As%20DOJ%20Confirms%20a%20Change%20in%20Anittrust%20Patent%20Policyk%20Lawyers%20Prepare%20for%20Shifting%20Demand%20-%20The%20National%20Law%20Journal.pdf)

The Justice Department has confirmed it is looking to develop new policies surrounding how standard-essential patents might be used as tools for anticompetitive practices. The change in policy will mean big business for law firms that can combine highly technical IP advice with their antitrust and litigation practices, with one lawyer likening the demanding skill set to “three-dimensional chess.” Standard-essential patents, or SEPs, are a fundamental piece of intellectual property for business and innovation because they are used under license so frequently by manufacturing companies other than the patent owners. The policy change was hinted at during an online event in late May, when Richard Powers, the acting attorney general of DOJ’s antitrust division, gave an indication that the government might be walking back the relaxed approach implemented by the DOJ under the Trump administration. A DOJ spokesperson confirmed in an email Tuesday to Law.com that it will change its policy on SEPs and antitrust behavior, with the agency still working out the details. The new administration, said the DOJ spokesperson, is rethinking what policies at the intersection of IP and anti- trust will best serve competition and consumers. “New Department leadership is working with career staff on developing a more balanced approach,” said the DOJ spokesperson. “The department wants to develop neutral and balanced policies in this area that recognize the importance of both antitrust enforcement and JUNE 15, 2021 As DOJ Confirms a Change in Antitrust Patent Policy, Lawyers Prepare for Shifting Demand BY BRUCE LOVE U.S. law has often shied away from enforcing essential patent obligations. That’s set to change. The result could be “a significant change in the volume and nature of business for IP trial lawyers and their clients,” one lawyer said. Office of the Attorney General at the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. June 6, 2020. THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL JUNE 15, 2021 intellectual property protection to our economy and that do not favor one set of interests over others.” Such policy changes could result in a swell of business for law firms with deep, technical IP benches and strong experience representing the industry in enforcement actions, lawyers said. Trump’s DOJ had “taken its foot off the gas” when it came to SEPs as the focus of anti-competitive behavior, said one Washington-based lawyer, speaking on the condition of anonym- ity because he currently has active cases that involve both SEP enforcement and defense. “It didn’t mean we weren’t busy as litigators. There was a lot of work enforcing SEPs against infringers and defending against infringement allegations,” he said. “But we weren’t busy in the antitrust arena. A greater focus on SEPs—not just by the DOJ but also other agencies—might mean more litigation, but it will also mean a more transparent field of play. It doesn’t do companies any good for there to be unfettered SEP enforcement.”

#### Biden’s XO solves---he’s devoting all resources on deck to prosecuting antitrust.

Posner 21, professor at the University of Chicago Law School (Eric, 7-21-2021, "The Antitrust War’s Opening Salvo", Project Syndicate, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/biden-antitrust-executive-order-what-it-does-by-eric-posner-2021-07>. Accessed 7-22-21)

The executive order is ambitious in its scope and style. In strongly worded passages, it accuses businesses of monopolistic and unfair practices in major industries, including technology, agriculture, health care, and telecommunications. It laments the decline of government antitrust enforcement, and identifies numerous harms that have resulted – including economic stagnation and rising inequality.

The order also establishes a new bureaucratic organization in the White House to lead the anti-monopoly effort. Demanding a “whole-of-government” approach, it calls on the vast resources of numerous agencies, and not just the two that traditionally oversee antitrust (the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission).

#### **No US-China war.**

Lei 20, PhD and MA in International Politics, associate research fellow with the China Institute of International Studies. (Cui, 7-24-2020, "Despite heated talk, risk of a US-China hot war is small", *South China Morning Post*, https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3094121/why-risk-us-china-hot-war-small-despite-heated-talk)

Many observers are pessimistic about deteriorating US-China relations and believe the two countries are heading towards a cold war. Even worse, some argue that the situation might be more dangerous than the US-Soviet Union Cold War, and that a hot war might break out between the two. This argument is unconvincing. First of all, deterrents to a flare-up are much stronger in US-China relations than in US-Soviet relations. Although economic and people-to-people ties between China and the US are declining, they are still close compared to US-Soviet ties. It is hard to decouple two closely intertwined economies and societies. Take two examples. China is expected to become the world's largest consumer market, a temptation hard to resist for exporters, including those from the US. And in education, more than 300,000 Chinese students study in the US, bringing in huge revenues for the US education industry. Many universities go to great lengths to woo international students. Recently Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology even sued the government over its new visa restrictions, now aborted, on international students. Second, even if there is decoupling, the pain would not be too great and can be kept out of the national security sphere if properly handled. In fact, for national security reasons, a modest degree of isolation will make both sides more secure and comfortable. For instance, if China’s information technology equipment cannot capture Western markets, the US will be more relaxed. If China cannot get advanced technologies from the US and its technological progress slows down, the US will be less anxious. In the same vein, China feels assured knowing that if the Trump administration does impose a travel ban on Communist Party members, it would be abandoning one of the tools available to the US to promote “peaceful evolution” in China. Economic decoupling is undeniably more painful for China than for the US. But unlike Japan during WWII, which was hit hard by the US oil embargo because of its lack of natural resources, China has no such problems. Given its large domestic market, losing the US as a major customer is not a disaster for China, and can be compensated through more dynamic economic activities at home. China can also make up for being freezed out of technological exchanges by turning to indigenous innovation. As for the US, it can import goods from other developing countries, albeit less cheaply. The relative loss is acceptable when weighed against the heightened perception of economic independence and security. Third, the ideological confrontation between China and the US is less intense than that during the Cold War. Unlike the obsession with ideology in those days, the line between capitalism and socialism is blurred today. The market economy has become universally recognised as the best way to promote economic growth and, politically, many countries have embraced democracy. Even North Korea calls itself the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Although ideological hawks in the US still long for the day when the beacon of freedom will light up the world, after many years of fighting bloody wars overseas, most American people are not interested in promoting democracy abroad. Meanwhile, China just wants to preserve its political system and has no interest in exporting it to other countries, as the Soviet Union did. Thus, ideological antagonism in China-US relations can easily be eased by calculations of realistic interests, which create conditions for compromise and cooperation. Fourth, both China and the US have many options other than war to achieve their policy goals. While they have no allies to serve as a buffer, given the nature of the potential conflict in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait, both countries are adept at operating in grey zones and fighting psychological, public opinion or diplomatic warfare below the threshold of war. The forced closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston by the US government is just the latest act of brinkmanship. In addition, given China’s huge economic and financial interests in the US, the latter can wield the stick of sanctions when use of force is highly risky or not worth it. When both sides have many tools and options, why would they rush to war to achieve their goals? Last but not least, the imbalance of power will act as a deterrent. Some say the US and Soviet Union did not fight a hot war because they were evenly matched. It was not the case, actually. At the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was at a relative military disadvantage. Moreover, a country needs the will to fight before going to war, even if it is stronger militarily than its adversary. Having fought years of meaningless wars, the US is weary of war. China, too, abhors war. Having a clear understanding of US strength, especially when its own economy is slowing down and it is facing various domestic challenges, China would not wish to recklessly start a war with the US. In summary, the possibility of a hot war between China and the US is very small. The greatest danger for China is not a cold or hot confrontation with the US, but policymakers’ interpretation of the momentary hostility towards Beijing of a portion of the American population and the larger world. An erroneous interpretation could end China’s march to further opening up, and see it turn instead towards self-isolation.

## DA — Innovation

#### *Every single* neg innovation claim is false---overdeterrence and “false positives” are wrong, FRAND rates sufficiently motivate innovation, and holdup outweighs.

Leslie 20, \*Christopher R. Leslie, Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California Irvine School of Law; (2020,“The DOJ’s Defense of Deception:   
Antitrust Law’s Role in Protecting the Standard-Setting Process”, https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/25382/1\_Leslie\_FNL.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)

1. Innovation

In his speeches, Delrahim tries to create the specter of antitrust liability destroying innovation incentives if FRAND violations are treated as anticompetitive conduct.152 In particular, Delrahim argues that, even in the presence of FRAND commitments, courts should grant injunctions against alleged infringers in order to “optimize[] the incentive[s] to innovate for the benefit of the public.”153 At times, he asserts that allowing owners of FRAND-encumbered SEPs to enjoin manufacturers from making products is necessary to reward inventors.154 This is counterintuitive. Allowing patentholders to evade their contractual commitments made to SSOs does not “reward[] successful inventors,” as Delrahim argues.155 Rather, it distorts the competitive process through which the standard was initially adopted, which was based on the patentholders’ representations that they would charge FRAND royalties.156 Moreover, there is nothing in patent law that suggests—let alone mandates—that patentholders should be able to maximize their profits by any means they choose.157

Delrahim repeatedly describes FRAND violators as “innovators” and suggests that this characterization alone warrants antitrust immunity, lest liability deter or discourage inventors from inventing.158 But this is a red herring, a distraction. If a patentholder monopolizes a market solely through its innovation, and nothing else, the monopoly is legal. But no one is suggesting that monopolization through innovation should trigger antitrust liability. Rather, it is a patentholder’s deception and/or breach of relied-upon commitments that leads to antitrust scrutiny, because neither of these bad acts represents competition on the merits.159 Delrahim asserts that acquiring market power “as a result of a patent holder’s so-called ‘deception’ about its licensing obligations . . . is not the sort of market-power-enhancing conduct that Section 2 should reach because a cause of action for treble damages would impede the policies underlying the Sherman Act.”160 Delrahim never really explains why monopolization-through-deception is not conduct that violates Section 2. Instead, he expresses concern that patentholders may be liable for treble damages.161 But treble damages are easy to avoid: if the monopolist patentholder does not engage in deception and honors its FRAND commitments, then it will not be on the hook for any damages. In a similar vein, Delrahim notes that “the Supreme Court has cautioned against antitrust standards that would create an unacceptable risk of ‘false positives’ or condemnations of lawful pro-competitive conduct.”162 Invoking that concern, Delrahim asserts that holding innovators liable for their misconduct could deter innovation.163 That is absurd. Liability for misconduct deters misconduct. It does not deter any lawful behavior that is not the basis for liability in the first place. Delrahim offers no explanation for why holding patentees liable for breaking their FRAND commitments after having deceived an SSO into incorporating their patented invention into a standard would be likely to produce “false positives” against patentholders who have not engaged in such behavior.164

Delrahim consistently fails to appreciate how easy it is for an SEP owner to avoid antitrust liability: license the patent on FRAND terms. If there is a dispute about what constitutes a FRAND royalty, the patentholder can go to court and get a ruling on the FRAND rate, instead of suing for an injunction and threatening to drive a manufacturer from the market. Seeking and following judicial guidance on the FRAND rate immunizes the SEP owner against both antitrust liability and a breach of contract lawsuit. Some of Delrahim’s innovation arguments read like a defense of patent holdup writ large. For example, he asserts, “An antitrust duty to license on FRAND terms would also contravene the patent laws’ policy of promoting innovation by offering incentives for holders of valid patents to seek the greatest rewards possible for their inventions.”165 Taken at face value, this approach would eliminate antitrust liability for any patentholders’ anticompetitive conduct (tying, sham litigation, etc.) because such liability would reduce the maximum possible return they could earn on their patent.166 Delrahim’s statement ignores the fact that the patentholder acquired its monopoly power by legally promising not “to seek the greatest rewards possible for [its] invention[].”167

Furthermore, Delrahim is wrong to assert that antitrust liability for willful misconduct weakens incentives for innovation. The patentee is receiving just compensation under the FRAND regime.168 By bargaining to have its patent included in the industry standard, the SEP owner is locking in a steady stream of profits. Delrahim provides no evidence that these FRAND royalties are insufficient to reward and encourage innovation. And, in any event, the patentholder chose to pursue FRAND royalties rather than maintaining its patent outside the standard and retaining the right to set its own royalty rate for its patented technology. To make his innovation-based arguments, Delrahim describes a binary world in which firms are either innovators or implementers, and the “dueling interests of innovators and implementers always are in tension.”169 If this were a tug-of-war match, Delrahim would be loudly rooting for the innovators. Delrahim does not merely champion innovators; he affirmatively disparages implementers and the work of standard-setting organizations, which he accuses of having been “given too little scrutiny when they have acted as a forum to slow down, rather than to facilitate, the adoption of disruptive innovations.”170

The development of advanced technological goods, however, is not a zero-sum game in which one team wins and the other team loses. Delrahim’s description of the relationship between innovators and implementers is deeply flawed because no clear line separates these groups. In response to his first deception-forgiving speech, a group of leaders in the high-tech industry wrote to Delrahim, “We are not mere implementers of standards. Rather, we contribute technologies to standards and drive research, development, investment and innovation throughout the value chain.”171 Signatories to the letter included Apple, Audi, Cisco Systems, Dell, Hewlett Packard, Intel, Microsoft, and Samsung—all major players in the innovation game. In short, Delrahim is wrong to suggest that implementers are not innovators and that recognizing their legal rights would somehow hurt innovation.172

Moreover, Delrahim ignores an entire class of (undisputed) innovators—those inventors who own patented technology that was not included in the adopted standard. Unchosen standards are often rife with innovations. When a patent owner engages in deception to secure a particular standard, the innovators who own patents that would have been SEPs for an alternative standard that was not selected due to another patentee’s deceptive conduct suffer a loss of revenue that could constitute a form of antitrust injury.

Not only is Delrahim’s innovation analysis incorrect, it is counterproductive to its stated goals. The industry letter in response to Delrahim’s first speech explained that the Trump appointee’s approach would “instead threaten US industry and consumer interests, harm US innovation, and interfere with parties’ right to contract.”173 The Department of Justice used to recognize this, noting in its prior joint statement with the PTO that “F/RAND commitments may also contribute to increased follow-on innovation by allowing nondiscriminatory access to networks both to new entrants and to established market participants to introduce new generations of network-operable devices.”174 Patent holdup harms innovation by discouraging firms from participating in SSOs because “[w]here the danger of abuse undermines the collaborative process by threatening to extract supracompetitive prices from competitors, industry members are less likely to participate in SSOs in the future and, as a result, consumers are less likely to benefit from these organizations.”175 Douglas Melamed and Carl Shapiro have explained that “supracompetitive pricing by SEP holders increases the cost of follow-on inventions that build on or improve the technologies claimed by the SEPs. This cost acts as a tax on follow-on innovation, reducing such innovations and impairing the very process of invention that the patent laws are intended to promote.”176 Moreover, because Delrahim looks at the issue only through the eyes of the SEP owner that seeks to evade its FRAND obligation, he overlooks the fact that by delaying the implementation of the standard, the holdout who commits holdup hurts all the other innovators who have SEPs.177 Ultimately, because SSOs facilitate and reward innovation and because patent holdup can chill industry members from participating in the standard-setting process, the failure to deter and remedy patent holdup harms innovation.178 Former FTC Commissioner Terrell McSweeny explained that “[b]y protecting the integrity of the standard-setting process itself, sound antitrust enforcement actually strengthens market opportunities for new technologies, thus improving the incentive for valuable innovation.”179 Thus, while Delrahim is right to praise innovation, he is wrong to argue that permitting deception and FRAND violations is the correct way to encourage innovation.

#### 2---ex ante valuation preserves profit due to mass licensing volume---that’s Melamed and Shapiro and…

Stern 18, \*Richard H. Stern, Professorial Lecturer in Law, The George Washington University Law School. A Washington, D.C. patent and antitrust attorney, Stern was Chief of the Patent Section of the US Justice Department’s Antitrust Division during the Nixon and Ford Administrations; (2018, “Who Should Own the Benefits of Standardization and the Value It Creates?”, https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1439&context=mjlst)

D. INCENTIVIZE ME OR I’LL DEFECT

A highly theoretical argument is often made by SEP owner spokesmen—that lessened compensation to SEP owners will “disincentivize” them from creating technology and contributing it to standardization, stagnating further standardization. For example:

If the SEP holder cannot capture any of the value from standardization that its technology creates for the standard, it will have a dampened incentive to continue contributing its best technologies to SSOs. In the long run, the quality of technologies contributed to a future standard—and the expected value of that new standard—would decrease. The SEP holder’s decision to contribute its technologies to a standard depends on the compensation that an SEP holder expects to obtain from such a contribution, compared with the SEP holder’s alternative option to monetize its invention outside the standard. . . . If the SEP holder expects not to be compensated fully for its contributions, it will not commit its most valuable technologies to the standard.431

But the amount of dampening of incentive (assuming that we do not already have enough or more than enough incentive for smartphones) may well be outweighed in impact by the prospect of nonetheless gaining first-user and head-start advantage from incorporation of one’s technology into a standard, and the opportunity to increase one’s equipment sales

(anointed with the imprimatur of the standard),432 even if one cannot also obtain monopoly profits as well, from SEP royalties. In a sense, those advantages are a form of “the compensation that an SEP holder expects to obtain” from such a SEP contribution, but the commentator fails to take those significant incentives into consideration.433 Moreover, the supposed “SEP holder’s alternative option to monetize its invention outside the standard” may be a figment of the SEP holder spokesman’s imagination.434 If an alternative technology becomes standard, the only opportunity to monetize the withheld invention may be to incorporate the technology into unsaleable non-standard products. Defection may be a poor business strategy.

## DA — Court Clog

**Court clog is fearmongering.**

**Stern 03** – J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2001, The Johns Hopkins University. (Toby J., “FEDERAL JUDGES AND FEARING THE "FLOODGATES OF LITIGATION," UPenn Journal of Law, 2004, <https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/conlaw/articles/volume6/issue2/Stern6U.Pa.J.Const.L.377(2003).pdf)>

One of the most easily identifiable problems with the floodgates argument is that it is rarely, if ever, followed by a true analysis of the potential litigation of which it speaks. That is, one response to a floodgates argument might be, "Are you sure that a contrary position would yield a flood of litigation?" 82 This criticism is frequently leveled against the floodgates argument, especially in the realm of tort litigation. For example, as one commentator has argued: The "floodgates of litigation" argument has proven wrong time and again. The lifting of the "impact" rule in rewarding damages for mental anguish, allowing third parties to recover under contracts, and the recognition of the right to privacy, were all prophesied to overwhelm the courts with frivolous claims. **They have not**. This argument, one should think, is relatively strong. While the floodgates argument is generally based on policy considerations,8 5 policy arguments are rarely so indeterminate. While moral arguments are certainly not precise--one cannot quantify, say, "fairness" or 'justice"-they are simply used differently. That is, when a judge says that a decision "promote [s] justice,"8 6 ~~he or she~~ [they] is not speaking about a tangible, actual result. In contrast, when a judge expresses that a decision will open the floodgates of litigation, he or she [they] is saying that there will be actual, cognizable caseload results from the decision. Given how often the floodgates do not open when we are warned that they will,"' making the argument without a proper foundation is dangerous. While there certainly are situations in which a judge should consider the implications of a decision on ~~his or her~~ [their] caseload, 8 doing so without considering the factual bases of those implications is problematic.'8 9 And while uncertainty is an unavoidable part of the law,' 90 the language with which the floodgates argument is regularly employed expresses anything but conjecture and uncertainty. The arguments are forceful; they are intended to conjure "[i] mages of a destructive, elemental force."'9' After all, as Judge Posner notes, "So irregular has been the growth of the caseloads of each of the three tiers of the federal judiciary in the past, and so many and poorly understood are the causes of changes in judicial caseloads, that it is impossible to make responsible predictions about future changes.' 92 The failure of judges to recognize this limitation of the argument reduces the weight afforded thereto.

#### The DOJ is already prepared to engage in more antitrust litigation over SEP’s.

Love 21, \*Bruce Love, writer at the National Law Journal; (June 15th, 2021, “As DOJ Confirms a Change in Antitrust Patent   
Policy, Lawyers Prepare for Shifting Demand”, https://www.mckoolsmith.com/assets/htmldocuments/2021%2006%2016%20As%20DOJ%20Confirms%20a%20Change%20in%20Anittrust%20Patent%20Policyk%20Lawyers%20Prepare%20for%20Shifting%20Demand%20-%20The%20National%20Law%20Journal.pdf)

The Justice Department has confirmed it is looking to develop new policies surrounding how standard-essential patents might be used as tools for anticompetitive practices. The change in policy will mean big business for law firms that can combine highly technical IP advice with their antitrust and litigation practices, with one lawyer likening the demanding skill set to “three-dimensional chess.” Standard-essential patents, or SEPs, are a fundamental piece of intellectual property for business and innovation because they are used under license so frequently by manufacturing companies other than the patent owners. The policy change was hinted at during an online event in late May, when Richard Powers, the acting attorney general of DOJ’s antitrust division, gave an indication that the government might be walking back the relaxed approach implemented by the DOJ under the Trump administration. A DOJ spokesperson confirmed in an email Tuesday to Law.com that it will change its policy on SEPs and antitrust behavior, with the agency still working out the details. The new administration, said the DOJ spokesperson, is rethinking what policies at the intersection of IP and anti- trust will best serve competition and consumers. “New Department leadership is working with career staff on developing a more balanced approach,” said the DOJ spokesperson. “The department wants to develop neutral and balanced policies in this area that recognize the importance of both antitrust enforcement and JUNE 15, 2021 As DOJ Confirms a Change in Antitrust Patent Policy, Lawyers Prepare for Shifting Demand BY BRUCE LOVE U.S. law has often shied away from enforcing essential patent obligations. That’s set to change. The result could be “a significant change in the volume and nature of business for IP trial lawyers and their clients,” one lawyer said. Office of the Attorney General at the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. June 6, 2020. THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL JUNE 15, 2021 intellectual property protection to our economy and that do not favor one set of interests over others.” Such policy changes could result in a swell of business for law firms with deep, technical IP benches and strong experience representing the industry in enforcement actions, lawyers said. Trump’s DOJ had “taken its foot off the gas” when it came to SEPs as the focus of anti-competitive behavior, said one Washington-based lawyer, speaking on the condition of anonym- ity because he currently has active cases that involve both SEP enforcement and defense. “It didn’t mean we weren’t busy as litigators. There was a lot of work enforcing SEPs against infringers and defending against infringement allegations,” he said. “But we weren’t busy in the antitrust arena. A greater focus on SEPs—not just by the DOJ but also other agencies—might mean more litigation, but it will also mean a more transparent field of play. It doesn’t do companies any good for there to be unfettered SEP enforcement.”

#### Dozens of thumpers.

ABA 16, American Bar Association. (2-10-2016, “The United States and Human Rights Treaties: Can We Meet Our Commitments?”, <https://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/2015--vol--41-/vol--41--no--2---human-rights-at-home/the-united-states-and-human-rights-treaties--can-we-meet-our-com/>)

Despite these deficiencies, the United States thinks too highly of itself to treat international human rights law—at least when applied to us—as law. We ratify few human rights treaties. We attach multiple conditions (called “reservations, understandings, and declarations”) to those we do ratify. We declare even those treaties “not self-executing,” which renders them generally unenforceable in our courts (although they can still be used as interpretive guides for U.S. laws). And we decline to accept individual complaint procedures or clauses referring disputes under the treaties to the International Court of Justice. That said, a trio of treaties ratified during the terms of the first President Bush and President Clinton commit the United States internationally to respect and protect a wide range of human rights. Two decades later, however, Washington is unwilling or unable to live up to key promises it made under those treaties, at least in the view of the committees of international experts set up to oversee them. The three treaties are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), both joined by the United States in 1992; and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), joined by the United States in 1994. (We have ratified other human rights treaties on specific topics, such as the Genocide Convention and Protocols on child soldiers and child trafficking.) Civil and Political Covenant The ICCPR requires each of its 168 state parties “to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction” a menu of civil and political rights, without discrimination. For example, the ICCPR protects the rights to life, liberty, humane treatment, fair trial, and privacy. States must also ensure that victims of violations have an effective remedy. In grave public emergencies, certain ICCPR rights, including liberty and due process—but not freedom from torture—may be restricted. However, both the emergency and the restrictions (called “derogations”) must be formally notified to the UN. The restrictions must also be limited to the extent and duration strictly required. The United States has never derogated from the ICCPR. Convention against Race Discrimination CERD’s 177 state parties are barred from allowing distinctions based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin, whose “purpose or effect” is to nullify or impair the equal exercise of human rights. Parties undertake to pursue a policy to eliminate racial discrimination. They must ensure equal treatment with respect to a broad range of rights, such as the right to vote and the right to security against police violence. Victims of violations must have effective remedies, including “just and adequate reparation.” Affirmative action—within limits—is encouraged. CERD authorizes “special measures” for the purpose of securing “adequate advancement” of certain racial groups, so long as the measures do not lead to the “maintenance of separate rights” and do not continue after their goals are achieved. The CERD expert committee (see below) interprets this as an “obligation” to adopt special measures when warranted to eliminate “persistent” racial disparities. Convention against Torture CAT categorically prohibits torture: “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” Each of CAT’s 158 state parties is mandated to take effective measures to prevent, punish, and redress torture. Treaty Reporting and Expert Committees All three treaties require state parties to submit periodic reports on compliance to committees of experts. The committees also receive “shadow reports” from nongovernmental groups—from scores of groups in the case of the United States. After public hearings in which committee members question and dialogue with government delegations, the committees issue “concluding observations” and ask that follow-up reports be submitted one year later. The committees have long had distinguished U.S. members. The current U.S. member of the Human Rights Committee, which oversees the ICCPR, is Professor Sarah Cleveland of Columbia Law School. The U.S. member of the CERD committee is Professor Carlos Vázquez of Georgetown Law, and of the CAT committee, Felice Gaer, director of the Jacob Blaustein Institute. CAT committee chair Claudio Grossman, the Chilean member, is dean of Washington College of Law at American University. Treaty Norms vs. U.S. Norms In 2014, all three committees issued concluding observations on U.S. reports. They began by commending positive steps taken by the United States since the previous round of reporting, such as the Supreme Court decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), ruling the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional; President Obama’s 2009 executive order prohibiting torture; his ongoing efforts to close Guantanamo; and the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced racial sentencing disparities for crack cocaine versus powdered cocaine. Each committee then elaborated its “concerns.” From a U.S. perspective, one might group them in three broad categories: (1) U.S. rejection of treaty norms for reasons that many U.S. human rights lawyers would applaud; (2) U.S. rejection of treaty norms for reasons deeply embedded in U.S. legal and political culture;

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and (3) U.S. violations of treaty norms, even where they are consistent with American culture and values. In the first category—laudable U.S. departures—one might place overbroad bans on hate speech. CERD requires criminalization of “all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred.” The ICCPR bans all “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.” The United States adopted reservations to these provisions on First Amendment grounds. Nonetheless the CERD committee urges the United States to consider criminalizing racist hate speech, even when it does not incite imminent violence or “true threats” of violence. Many U.S. human rights lawyers would support the U.S. position to allow hate speech that falls short of such incitement. In the second category—norms incompatible with embedded U.S. culture—one might place the Human Rights Committee’s call for the United States to consider acceding to an Optional Protocol to the ICCPR abolishing the death penalty. Another candidate might be the CERD committee’s call for the United States to redefine racial discrimination across the board in order to meet CERD’s “purpose or effect” definition. The Supreme Court has held that the test for violating constitutionally mandated equal protection of the law is a purpose test, not an effects test. While some U.S. laws use a “disproportionate impact” test, most do not. U.S. law is unlikely to move toward an “effects” test anytime soon. This reality neutralizes many CERD committee recommendations to the United States. CERD committee concerns rest on disproportionate impact in such areas as denial of voting rights to convicted felons, gun violence, aspects of criminal justice and juvenile justice, and inadequate legal aid. While there are serious racial gaps in all these areas, and CERD may help focus attention by placing them under an international spotlight, the United States is more likely to treat them as policy problems than as unlawful discrimination. On the other hand, CERD concerns about disparate racial impacts in housing—resulting from urban environmental pollution, criminalization of homelessness, and mortgage-lending practices and foreclosures—may prove to be in sync with the “disparate impact” test under the U.S. Fair Housing Act as recently interpreted by the Supreme Court in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). Fair housing may thus potentially fit within the third category of issues, where human rights treaties are consistent with both U.S. national values and our legal culture. In these areas, Washington should live up to our international commitments without delay. The following are illustrative: Torture and Accountability CAT requires the United States to: prevent torture “in any territory under its jurisdiction”; criminalize all acts of torture; make these offenses punishable by penalties that “take into account their grave nature”; establish jurisdiction over torture by U.S. nationals; ensure a “prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed in any territory under its jurisdiction”; ensure that victims of torture obtain redress and fair and adequate compensation; and refrain from sending someone to a country if there are “substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” Since 2001, the United States has violated all these treaty commitments. In December 2014, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released a 500-page executive summary of its report on CIA detention and interrogation. In a foreword, Committee Chair Dianne Feinstein expressed her “personal conclusion that, under any common meaning of the term, CIA detainees were tortured.” She was correct. The Committee found, for example: “Sleep deprivation involved keeping detainees awake for up to 180 hours, usually standing or in stress positions, at times with their hands shackled over their heads. At least five detainees experienced disturbing hallucinations . . . .” “The waterboarding technique was physically harmful, inducing convulsions and vomiting.” One detainee “became ‘completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth.’ Internal CIA records describe the waterboarding of [another prisoner] as . . . a ‘series of near drownings.’” Techniques such as slamming detainees against a wall were used “with significant repetition for days or weeks at a time” “in combination, frequently concurrent with sleep deprivation and nudity.” One detention facility was a “dungeon,” the chief CIA interrogator said. Detainees were “in complete darkness and constantly shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste. Lack of heat . . . likely contributed to [a detainee’s] death.” The Committee also found that the CIA repeatedly misled the Justice Department about interrogation techniques and confinement conditions. The CIA’s “inaccurate and incomplete” information impeded effective oversight by the White House and Congress. CIA misinformation “complicated, and in some cases impeded” the national security work of the FBI, Director of National Intelligence, and State Department. Against this backdrop, the United States should heed the recommendations of the CAT committee. The first set of recommendations concerns inadequate legislation. The U.S. Code criminalizes torture abroad but not in the United States. The CAT committee “regrets that the specific offense of torture has not yet been introduced at the federal level.” Even where torture is a crime, the committee “regrets” that the United States restrictively interprets CAT by narrowing the definition of “mental harm” that can qualify as torture (although the Senate Committee findings reveal that the CIA tortured even by that narrower definition). Legislation is critical. The CAT committee welcomed the United States’ “unequivocal commitment to abide by the universal prohibition of torture and ill-treatment everywhere,” as well as U.S. assurances that its personnel are legally barred from committing torture and ill-treatment “at all times and in all places.” However, this bar rests in part on executive orders overturnable at the stroke of a pen. The committee recommended that the United States amend its laws and withdraw its reservation implying a territorial limitation on CAT applicability. In November 2015, President Obama signed into law, as part of the FY 2016 defense authorization bill, the McCain-Feinstein amendment to effectively prohibit torture by U.S. government agencies. Even so, the new law does not address the CAT committee’s concern for lack of accountability and redress. No CIA or military personnel have been prosecuted for torture per se (although low-ranking military personnel have been prosecuted for lesser offenses). Nor has there been civil redress. In 2014, the D.C. Circuit ruled that Congress had barred a civil damages remedy for a detainee allegedly tortured at Guantanamo. Janko v. Gates, 741 F.3d 136 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1530 (2015). Secret Detention For at least five years after 2001, the CIA held detainees in secret “black sites” overseas. While a 2009 Executive Order directed that the CIA close its sites and not open any new ones, that order is not embodied in legislation. The CAT committee recommended that the United States “[e]nsure that no one is held in secret detention anywhere under its de facto effective control.” The committee reiterated that secret detention is a per se CAT violation. Indefinite Detention without Trial The CAT committee reminded the United States that “indefinite detention without trial constitutes, per se, a violation” of CAT. It noted that during the period under review nine deaths occurred at Guantanamo, including seven suicides, as well as repeated suicide attempts and mass hunger strike protests. In March 2015, the United States reported to the UN Human Rights Committee that of the 122 prisoners still at Guantanamo, 56 were cleared for transfer, had not yet been transferred, and had no immediate relief in sight; 10 were involved in some form of criminal justice; and the remaining 56 were “eligible for review” by the Periodic Review Board—i.e., they are still detained indefinitely without trial. The Human Rights Committee expressed concern that detainees at Guantanamo “are not dealt with through the ordinary criminal justice system after a protracted period of over a decade, in some cases.” It recommended that the United States should “ensure either their trial or their immediate release.” Military Commission Trials In March 2015, the United States reported to the Human Rights Committee that 10 Guantanamo detainees were currently facing charges, awaiting sentencing, or serving sentences imposed by military commissions. Although the United States contends that military commission trials are fair, the Committee recommended that the United States ensure that any criminal cases against detainees at Guantanamo be “dealt with through the criminal justice system rather than military commissions.” Drone Deaths As highlighted by President Obama’s recent apologies to families of two American hostages killed in drone attacks, the use of armed drones endangers innocents and raises serious questions under international law. The Human Rights Committee recommended that the United States: “revisit its position regarding legal justification”; ensure compliance with the principles of “precaution, distinction and proportionality”; disclose, subject to operational security, the criteria for drone strikes, the legal basis for specific attacks, the process of target identification, and the circumstances in which drones are used; provide “independent supervision and oversight” of drone attacks; take “all feasible measures to ensure the protection of civilians” in specific attacks; track and assess civilian casualties; investigate and bring to justice anyone responsible for violations of the right to life; and provide victims with effective remedies and compensation. Intelligence Surveillance The Human Rights Committee expressed its concern over NSA surveillance, including the bulk phone metadata surveillance program. It recommended that the United States ensure that interference with privacy comply with “principles of legality, proportionality and necessity, regardless of the nationality or location of the individuals whose communications are under direct surveillance.” While the recently enacted USA Freedom Act is a step toward that goal, more safeguards are needed. See, e.g., Neema Singh Guliani, What’s Next for Surveillance Reform after the USA Freedom Act, ACLU (June 3, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/washington-markup/whats-next-surveillance-reform-after-usa-freedom-act. Police Killings The CERD committee expressed “concern at the brutality and excessive use of force by law enforcement officials against members of racial and ethnic minorities, including against unarmed individuals.” It recommended improved investigations, reporting, and redress. Criminal Justice The Human Rights Committee and CERD committee expressed a range of concerns about racial disparities in the criminal justice system, including racial profiling, stop-and-frisk arrests, and racial disparities in sentencing, including the death penalty. Voting The Human Rights Committee expressed concern over obstacles to voting, including burdensome voter identification and eligibility requirements. It recommended that voting rights be restored to felons who have completed their sentences, and that states “review automatic denial of the vote to any imprisoned felon, regardless of the nature of the offence.” Conclusion The foregoing is only a sampling of treaty committee recommendations, constrained by limitations of space. Interested readers can find the full committee reports and extensive documentation at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx. For anyone concerned about human rights in the United States, the inquiry is well worth the effort.

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## CP — ITC

#### Antitrust is key

Dogan 08, \*Stacey L. Dogan, Professor of Law, Northeastern University; \*Mark Lemley, William H. Neukom Professor, Stanford Law School; of counsel, Keker & Van Nest LLP; (October 2008, “Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming”, https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1873&context=faculty\_scholarship)

Our goal in this paper is not to persuade the reader that these particular examples of regulatory gaming violate the antitrust laws (though we think they do) or that other examples, such as regulatory price squeezes, do not violate the antitrust laws. Rather, our point is that whether or not particular acts of regulatory gaming harm competition is and should be an antitrust question, not merely one that involves interpreting statutes or agency regulations. Regulatory agencies and even Congress cannot prevent gaming ex ante. Experience with the pharmaceutical industry suggests that if Congress acts to squelch one form of gaming, companies will find other ways to game the system. And even if Congress or the regulating body can surgically fix a particular type of exclusionary behavior, such an ex post response (unlike the threat of antitrust treble damages) does nothing to compensate for past harm or to deter future gaming behavior. Some level of antitrust enforcement – with appropriate deference to firm decisions about product design and affirmative regulatory decisions that affect market conditions – provides a necessary check on behavior, such as product hopping, that has no purpose but to exclude competition.

## DA — Innovation / SSOs

#### Ex post royalties are not necessary to motivate innovation which is the only thing the aff changes

Bosworth et al. 17, \*D. Scott Bosworth is a Principal Economist at Nathan Associates; \*Russell W. Mangum is Executive Vice President at the American Antitrust Institute and Associate Professor of Economics in the School of Business and Economics at Concordia University Irvine; \* Eric Matolo is the Vice President of Cirque Analytics; (October 28th, 2017, “FRAND Commitments and Royalties for Standard Essential Patents”, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-10-6011-3\_2#Sec10)

The common justification for intellectual property law is that inventions must be properly protected to allow inventors to be rewarded for inventions, thereby stimulating innovation. However, promoting inventions and innovation does not justify, nor does it require, rewarding patent owners beyond the value of the technology the intellectual property is meant to protect. Allowing patent holders to extract the value of the network effect created from a standard rewards the patentees based on value beyond the patented technology. Without FRAND terms the network effects value will flow to SEP holders. Proper FRAND terms that keep SEP holders from extracting the value of network effects can still leave the efficient level of return for innovators—that based on the technology itself. In other words, extracting the value of network effects by SEP holders is not necessary to appropriately motivate innovation. Any value of the standardization resulting from collaborative efforts during the SSO process may ultimately be available in the public domain.

#### Ex post, patentees are motivated to overclaim patents---creating a thicket of nonessential patents that overburden implementers.

Hovenkamp 20, \*Herbert J. Hovenkamp is James G. Dinan University Professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania; (2020, “FRAND and Antitrust”, <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3095&context=faculty_scholarship>)

Having a patent declared standard essential can increase its value considerably, mainly because the promise of a license at a reasonable rate steers developmental decision making in favor of that particular technology. When a firm makes a commitment to develop its products under a particular standard, it wants assurance that it will have a durable right to operate under that standard at reasonable royalty rates. This process naturally leads to the creation of considerable path dependence in standards. It encourages firms to develop their own technology in ways that ensure interoperability but that can be costly to reverse after the fact.30

This phenomenon of increased value for SEPs also motivates patent owning firms to “over-claim”—that is, to assert that patents are standard essential when subsequent litigation or evaluation determines that they are not. While FRAND agreements require participants to declare relevant patents thought to be essential, the rate of actual declaration far exceeds any rational boundary. As many as one-third to more than half of declared SEPs are very likely not essential to the standard for which they were declared,31 and allegations about the practice of over-declaring are currently being litigated as potential antitrust violations.32 In fact, overall infringement rates for SEP patents are not materially different from those for non-SEP patents.33 A declaration of non-infringement means that, although the patent might be valid, it does not in fact read on the defendant’s particular device or process. In effect, the patent is not a part of the defendant’s technology, and thus cannot be essential. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that, for the most part, SSOs have no process up front for reviewing or questioning individual participants’ declarations

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that a patent they are offering is in fact both valid and standard essential.34

Ex ante, a patent may offer one of many alternative technological paths to a certain goal. However, ex post, after a standard has been adopted and others have developed their technologies in reliance, the range of acceptable alternatives can decrease dramatically. As a result, the patent whose path is adopted becomes much more valuable.35 In that case, a firm’s ability to evade the FRAND obligation by charging selectively higher royalties to some licensees or conditioning licenses on the purchase of other technology can be extremely lucrative for the patentee but costly to implementers of the standard and disruptive of the SSO’s developmental goals.36 In its Qualcomm decision noted above, the Ninth Circuit did not indicate any awareness of these motivations or their potential for harm.37